2017年1月8日 星期日
美洲國家組織舉辦義雲高大師韻雕作品展
前言:
關於“第三世多杰羌佛”佛號的說明
二零零八年四月三日，由全球佛教出版社和世界法音出版社出版的《多杰羌佛第三世》寶書在美國國會圖書館舉行了莊嚴隆重的首發儀式，美國國會圖書館並正式收藏此書，自此人們才知道原來一直廣受大家尊敬的義雲高大師就是宇宙始祖報身佛多杰羌佛的第三世降世，佛號為第三世多杰羌佛，從此，人們就以“南無第三世多杰羌佛”來稱呼了。這就猶如釋迦牟尼佛未成佛前，其名號為悉達多太子，但自釋迦牟尼佛成佛以後，就改稱“南無釋迦牟尼佛”了，所以，我們現在稱“南無第三世多杰羌佛”。尤其是，二零一二年十二月十二日，美國國會參議院第614號決議正式以His Holiness來冠名第三世多杰羌佛（即H.H.第三世多杰羌佛），這說明了美國國會對南無第三世多杰羌佛的尊敬。而且，第三世多杰羌佛也是政府法定的名字，以前的“義雲高”和大師的尊稱已經不存在了。但是，這個新聞是在南無第三世多杰羌佛佛號未公布之前刊登的，那時人們還不了解佛陀的真正身份，所以，為了尊重歷史的真實，我們在新聞中仍然保留未法定第三世多杰羌佛稱號前所用的名字。
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美洲國家組織官方網站公告
OAS SECRETARY GENERAL OPENS EXHIBITION OF SCULPTURES
July 29, 2003
Noting that promoting cultural values is a priority of the inter-American system, the Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS), César Gaviria, opened an exhibition of carved stone sculptures by master artist Wan Ko Yee.
“During the last fifty years, the OAS has recognized the need to associate culture with development and the well-being of our peoples, and also the importance of demonstrating how powerful symbols of identities and beliefs can become a unifying factor for national and universal reconciliation,” Gaviria said. Diplomats from OAS member states and other dignitaries were among those who attended the opening reception, held the evening of July 28 at the Washington Marriott.
In his remarks, Gaviria praised the “pioneering” artistic work of the Buddhist artist and recognized him for championing charitable causes and humanitarian assistance programs in several Caribbean nations.
Grenada’s Ambassador to the OAS, Denis Antoine, said the artist had donated computers to needy schoolchildren in his country and supported other worthy projects. He said the Organization’s participation in the event underscored the importance of “cultural balance and tolerance for diversity in a global environment.”
Master Wan Ko Yee was born in China and now lives in the United States. His Yun sculptures are made of enormous boulders, hollowed out and carved to create a landscape shrouded in mist.
剪報附錄:
黄晓穗被香港法院判決入狱11年(含判決書)
人民网香港11月21日电
香港明星佛堂“云慈慧海”诈骗案昨天宣判。云慈慧海功德会前主席黄晓穗及其弟黄辉栋，分别被重判入狱11年及7年半，另被剥夺担任公司董事权利15年。2人的律师均认为刑罚极重。
法官指出，两被告犯案，令新华银行向次被告两间公司借出的9300万元贷款变成坏帐。
黄晓穗(44岁)及其弟黄辉栋(34岁，金科数码国际控股前董事总经理)，于1999年初伪造佛堂董事的会议议案，将“云慈慧海”位于九龙塘根德道22号价值5600万元的“大师馆”抵押给新华银行，藉此替黄辉栋的两间公司取得信贷服务。
法官指出，被告姐弟早就觊觎佛堂物业，根德道的物业1995年由佛堂“富豪信徒”刘百行购入后不足两年，被告即将物业交予银行估价，并且打算申请按揭，虽然后来放弃计划，但是1999年再将物业抵押，为黄辉栋名下的东荣有限公司以及嘉陵汽车(中国)有限公司取得4000万元信贷服务。按揭后不久，信贷户口即先后被提取2000万元。而直至现在，两间公司还分别欠新华银行3500万、5800万元。（吴酩）
消息来源：人民网 2002年11月21日
判決書連結:香港法院判處黃曉穗等的最終判決書
BETWEEN
Before: Hon Stuart-Moore VP, Stock JA and Lunn J
Date of Hearing: 26 October 2004
Date of Handing Down Judgment: 3 December 2004
Stuart-Moore, VP (giving the judgment of the Court):
2. D1 and D2 both sought leave to appeal against conviction. D1, additionally, sought leave to appeal against her sentence of imprisonment.
3. We can say at the outset that although this application was concerned with five grounds of appeal with which counsel had, in advance, very sensibly worked out a division of labour so that the same arguments were not repeated, there is, we consider, only one ground of any real substance. This related to the directions given by the judge on the standard of proof. Nonetheless, one of the other grounds requires an insight into the background of the case and it is necessary, therefore, to deal with this aspect before turning to the main ground of appeal.
6. Counts 3 and 4 both alleged that D1 and D2 had procured the execution of a valuable security, contrary to section 22(2) of the Theft Ordinance, Cap. 210. Count 3’s particulars were that between 1 February 1999 and 31 March 1999, they dishonestly and with a view to gain for themselves or another or with intent to cause loss to another:
9. D1 became a highly trusted disciple of Master Yi and acted as his representative in Hong Kong. However, in April 1997, about 18 months after the acquisition of the Property, D1’s younger brother, D2, who was neither a follower of Master Yi nor affiliated with IWM, attempted to offer the Property to the Sin Hua Bank (“the Bank”) as a security for obtaining banking facilities for his companies, Tacglory Limited (“Tacglory”) and PTM. In the event, this came to nothing.
10. Neither Tacglory nor PTM had any connection with the religious organisation to which D1 belonged. D1 and D2 were directors and shareholders of Tacglory. D2 and Tacglory were also directors and shareholders of PTM, and hence D1, through her interest in Tacglory, also had an interest in PTM.
11. Towards the end of 1998, the Bank reviewed the banking facilities to these companies and demanded additional security. Again this came to nothing, but, in early 1999, D2 again offered the Property as security to the Bank to obtain a credit facility for Tacglory. In short, this was achieved by using the eight documents purportedly signed by Mr Lau, PW2, D1 and some of the other directors. The documents formed the subject matter of the 1st and 2nd counts. The Bank then executed the two mortgages, the subject of the 3rd and 4th counts.
12. In July 1999, relations between Master Yi and his Hong Kong disciples turned sour. In essence, it was believed that he had acted fraudulently and also inappropriately in a number of other ways. Accordingly, it was resolved that the museum would be closed and that IWM would be disbanded.
13. On 18 September 1999, IWM passed a resolution to transfer the Property to Mr Lau. The meeting also authorised D1 to effect the transfer. It was after D1 had failed to carry out this task that the other directors and shareholders discovered for the first time that the Property had been mortgaged to the Bank as security for the banking facilities given to Tacglory and PTM. For his part, Mr Lau, who had been led by D1 to believe that D2 had a listed company and was a person of means, told D2 that he had never consented to the mortgage of the Property. In response, D2 remained motionless. Mr Lau suggested a solution to the problem by offering to pay $20 million leaving D2 to pay the balance of the sum to redeem the Property. The amount Mr Lau had offered to pay was fixed on the basis that the Property had been mortgaged for a total of $40 million and this went halfway. His concern was the damage that might otherwise be done to the religious organisation by the disgrace this incident could bring to its name. D2 replied that that could not be done as there were binding contracts between IWM and the two companies, Tacglory and PTM.
14. The matter was eventually reported to the Independent Commission Against Corruption (“ICAC”) after civil proceedings had been commenced.
15. Amongst the documents seized by ICAC from the Bank were the minutes of what purported to be meetings of IWM’s directors recording the resolutions of the shareholders and the declarations of the directors and shareholders of IWM approving the mortgage of the Property. These were all dated 9 February 1999. The prosecution’s case was that these documents (Exhibits P4 and P5) were either signed by the relevant directors and shareholders in blank form or were signed with no more than the standard preamble used for recording the minutes of meetings thereon and that, thereafter, resolutions had been added purporting to execute Deeds of Mortgage. It was alleged that D1 and D2 caused Exhibits P4 and P5 to be created so that these resolutions and other details could later be added to them. Needless to say, when the documents were signed in more or less blank form, they were intended by all the signatories except D1, IWM’s chairman, to be used for the legitimate affairs of IWM. The evidence clearly established that whatever else the documents might have been used for, they were not intended for the purpose of mortgaging the company’s property and that the relevant directors and shareholders, apart from D1, would not have signed the documents if they had known they were going to be used in this way.
17. D1’s defence at trial was presented on the basis of the answers she had provided in interview. D1 claimed that prior to July 1999, Mr Lau, PW2 and the other directors who signed the documents were devoted disciples of Master Yi and that they would have done anything for him. More specifically, they would sign any document Master Yi told them to. Accordingly, they signed the documents on the instructions of Master Yi, which D1 had transmitted to them, knowing that the documents were mortgage documents and in the full knowledge of what it was that they were being asked to sign. In relation to the 1st and 2nd counts, it was said that the documents were not forgeries and, in regard to counts 3 and 4, D1 asserted that there had been no deception.
18. D2’s case was also presented on the answers he gave at his interview. He said that he had acted at the request of his sister (D1), to raise $5 million for IWM at the bidding of Master Yi. He relied on what he was told by D1 as well as on the documents she supplied to him. D2 claimed to have had no knowledge of any forgery or deception, saying that if the documents were forgeries, he had not acted dishonestly.
19. The defence did not dispute that the applicants had jointly procured the Bank’s execution of the mortgage deeds by the use of Exhibits P4 and P5. It was claimed that after the Hong Kong disciples discovered that Master Yi was effectively a fraud, they levelled the blame at D1 because she had been closest to him and had acted as his Hong Kong representative. The disciples felt cheated out of large sums of money by Master Yi which they could not recover but, as the Property had been purchased with Mr Lau’s donation, this at least was still available. Mr Lau, it was alleged, had insisted that the Property should be returned to him and he had agreed to sell the Property so that the losses suffered by the Hong Kong disciples could be partly restored to them. For this reason, it was suggested, the Hong Kong disciples turned against D1 because of the benefit they hoped to gain from the sale of the Property. When D1 was unable to transfer the Property to Mr Lau, it was alleged that Mr Lau reported the matter to the ICAC in order to pressurise D1 into satisfying the civil claim against her.
21. The second main category of evidence came from bankers and lawyers who handled the mortgage of the Property. The lawyers acting on behalf of the Bank made it a condition of the mortgage that at least four directors should sign the minutes and that all three shareholders should sign the resolutions approving the use of the company’s property as security for the credit facilities of Tacglory and PTM.
22. Other evidence of considerable importance at trial came from an expert document examiner whose evidence was not seriously challenged. His findings went to prove that the documents (Exhibits P4 and P5) were false in the sense that later additions had been made to them.
23. As we have said already, there was a further category of evidence which related to the interviews of the applicants which provided the basis on which their cases were presented.
27. In Green v R [1971] 126 CLR 28, which Mr Grounds described as the seminal Australian case dealing with the point at issue, the High Court held that it was a misdirection to state that a reasonable doubt is confined to a “rational doubt” or a “doubt founded upon reason”. In that case, the trial judge had answered the rhetorical question he had posed, as to how the jury would know when they had reached the stage of being satisfied about something beyond a reasonable doubt, by directing them (in a passage which appears at pp. 30-31) that:
29. In a much later case to which we were taken, R v Krasniqi [1993] 69 A.Crim.R. 383, the South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal reviewed a number of earlier decisions on the point at issue, including R v Green, when concluding (at p. 391) that the summing up included an “undesirable elaboration on the burden of proof” but the court stated (at pp. 391-392):
32. In R v Goncalves [1997] A.Crim.R. 193, the Court of Criminal Appeal, Western Australia, dealt with an appeal which has relevance in the present context to the other words which are criticised in the summing up. There, a trial judge had directed the jury that reasonable doubt was: “not proof to the point of absolute certainty. It’s simply what the words say, ‘beyond reasonable doubt’”. The court held, when dismissing the appeal, that whilst this was an undesirable direction, the remark in its proper context could not be said to have misled the jury. Malcolm CJ (at p. 196) said:
34. The modern position in England and Wales dates back to Walters v R [1969] 2 AC 26. The developments on this topic since that time are well summarised in Archbold [2004] at paras. 4-384/5.
35. In Hong Kong, Kempster JA, in R v Lee Yuk-wah & Ors, CACC 467/1984 (unreported), described a “plethora of applications” following the decision in R v Yeung Kuen-chi & Anor, CACC 266/1984 where this court held that the following direction was misleading and wrong:
39. There were two passages shortly before the directions which are criticised. When dealing with the burden of proof, the judge said:
41. Perhaps in fairness to the judge, whilst in no sense is this to be taken as offering encouragement for the formula he chose to adopt in the passages which are criticised, it may be that he considered that the phraseology of D1’s trial counsel in his final speech called for something to be said over and above the usual direction given for the standard of proof beyond the words usually adopted to. Counsel had said as follows:
42. The impugned words used by the judge when he was giving the standard of proof directions have to be looked at in their full context. We do not consider, in the present circumstances, that the judge’s direction that “a fanciful, stupid or ridiculous doubt” or his reference to proof not having to reach the standard of “mathematical certainty”, unwise though those words undoubtedly were, could have led to any confusion on the jury’s part. It was made abundantly plain that the jury had to feel sure of guilt if they were to convict. The offending words, which form no part of the normal directions given to juries on the standard of proof, were immediately followed by the exhortation that the jury should feel sure of guilt. The jury were told that this was a very high standard and that unless they were sure of guilt beyond all reasonable doubt, it was their duty to acquit. The judge followed this by telling the jury in terms that suspicious circumstances or probable guilt were not enough.
43. In the light of our conclusion, we do not need to dwell at any length with the further contentions made by Mr Grounds that a misdirection on the ‘standard of proof’ might also have affected the jury’s approach to the ‘inferences’ which might be drawn from the evidence or to the issue of dishonesty alleged against D2 in counts 3 and 4.
44. All we need to say in regard to the ancillary submissions, which were effectively dependent on the principal ground succeeding, is that they added nothing of substance to the matters with which we have already dealt. The judge went to considerable lengths to sum up the defence which had been presented to the jury without, of course, the benefit of evidence from either of the applicants. Despite this, Mr Grounds submitted that D2 “may have stupidly believed or trusted his sister (D1) or there may have been an element of stupidity or ridiculousness or mathematical uncertainty involved which was capable of raising a doubt” in the jury’s approach to his defence and the issue of dishonesty. There was, however, no hint or suggestion in the papers before us that D2 suffered from stupidity or anything approaching it and such considerations would have been entirely speculative.
47. The directions given by the judge about lies were in these terms:
50. Mr Tam submitted that the ‘lies’ directions, taken overall, provided a clear message in circumstances where, at trial, counsel for D1 had alleged that Mr Lau and PW2 to PW5 had been lying while prosecuting counsel had said that the applicants had been lying in their interviews. D2’s case was that he had relied on what he was told by D1. The judge’s directions, it was submitted, removed the potential danger of the jury thinking that a defendant who had lied must be guilty.
51. In the first of these later directions, as all counsel accepted, it was not entirely clear what the judge was meaning to say in relation to D1 albeit there appears, in our view, to have been nothing contained in the passage which was prejudicial to her. The judge said:
54. The judge, on the issue of dishonesty, had directed the jury as follows:
56. As Mr Tam submitted, a fair reading of the passage shows that the judge was directing the jury that they had to decide two questions on the issue of dishonesty. These arose from the two limbs of the well-known test in R v Ghosh [1982] 1 QB 1053 at 1064. When the judge returned to this issue, he said:
60. We do not propose to say more on this point than that a careful draftsman would no doubt have described Exhibit P. 54 as a “document described as an agreement”. However, no one at trial was under any misapprehension about it nor could they reasonably have been.
62. The ‘alternative defence’ which Mr Poon had in mind was that D1 may have believed that the other Hong Kong disciples would not have objected to the application for a mortgage on the Property, even though their consent was not sought or obtained, “as she had been instructed to act in this way by Master Yi …… D1 may also have believed that they would not have questioned her evenif she had just typed in the mortgages unilaterally”.
63. The respondent’s submission that there was no evidence in the court below to raise these issues is well-founded. There was no evidence of any kind to suggest that D1 might have believed that she was entitled to make use of false documents in order to deceive a bank into granting credit facilities to her or her brother’s companies. Mr Poon, despite repeated requests to indicate any material from which such a defence might spring, was unable to do so.
66. The judge, when sentencing, correctly described D1 and D2 as having carried out a carefully planned fraud which had taken nearly two years to materialise. In early 1997, D1 and D2 arranged banking officers to view the Property on the pretext of raising a loan for IWM and later at the end of 1998 the Property was provided as security for credit facilities to Tacglory and PTM. The judge found that this was an elaborate fraud in which false corporate and banking documents were created and used to mortgage the Property of the religious body to which D1 belonged. The value of the Property was large and the Bank stood to lose a sizeable sum of money as the result of the fraud. $35 million was owed by Tacglory and another $58 million was owed by PTM to the Bank. D1 had shown no remorse for her wrongdoing, notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence against her.
67. These offences, as the judge commented, amounted not only to a fraud on the Bank but on IWM also. By their conduct, D1 and D2 had fraudulently mortgaged the Property. This had the effect of putting the interests of IWM at serious risk and deceiving the Bank into providing credit facilities which, in the event, resulted in the Bank sustaining substantial losses. Even on D1’s case, the mortgages were for $40 million.
68. We are asked to view this matter in effect as a fraud amounting to $40 million. As there has been no resolution so far to civil proceedings which are in progress, we propose, as the judge appears also to have done, to deal with the case on this basis.
69. Bearing in mind that D2 received a sentence of seven and a half years’ imprisonment, it was argued that this left a considerable disparity between his sentence and D1’s. Mr Poon submitted that whilst D1 may have made the whole venture possible and was deserving of a sentence no less than seven and a half years, a three-and-a-half-year difference between her sentence and that of her brother (D2) was too great.
70. We consider that this is a case which can properly be looked at as a whole. While there were four counts, the two sets of forged documents were used to obtain the two mortgage loans amounting to approximately $40 million. Had this been a single charge of theft of $40 million, which in effect this is, the sentence could have been no more than the statutory maximum of ten years for theft.
71. This was, so far as IWM was concerned, a considerable breach of trust on the part of D1. She was a shareholder and director who, behind the backs of the others, mortgaged the Property which was being held in trust for Mr Lau. This provides an aggravating factor which alone justified the judge in taking a much more serious view of D1’s role. Furthermore, as the judge remarked, D1 was the majority shareholder of Tacglory and must have stood to gain substantially from the fraud.
72. We derived little assistance from the large number of previous decisions of this count in other cases where large sums of money have been taken dishonestly by a variety of means. There are no guidelines for sentencing purposes and each case must be decided on its own facts. Having regard to the grave breach of her fiduciary duty towards the other shareholders and directors of IWM, and remembering that there has been no hint of remorse and no attempt to repay any part of the loss, we consider that a sentence of nine years’ imprisonment was appropriate for the criminality involved in D1’s conduct. In saying this, we are satisfied that a sentence of 11 years’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive.
73. Accordingly, we shall give leave and treating the hearing as the appeal, we allow the appeal to the extent that D1’s sentence is reduced by two years to nine years’ imprisonment on counts 1 and 2. The concurrent sentences of six years’ imprisonment on counts 3 and 4 will remain. All these sentences are to run concurrently, making nine years in all.
Mr Simon Tam, SGC, of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent.
Mr Albert Poon and Mr Vincent Poon, instructed by Messrs K.Y. Woo & Co., for D1/Applicant.
Mr Christopher Grounds and Ms Lydia L.K. Sun, instructed by Messrs Chiu, Szeto & Cheng, for D2/Applicant.
CACC 589/2002
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF APPEAL
criminal APPEAL NO. 589 OF 2002
(ON APPEAL FROM HCCC355 of 2001)
____________________
| HKSAR | Respondent | |
| and | ||
| WONG HIU SHUI, TERESA LINERA (黃曉穗) (D1) | Applicants | |
| WONG FAI TUNG (黃輝棟) (D2) |
____________________
Date of Hearing: 26 October 2004
Date of Handing Down Judgment: 3 December 2004
_______________
J U D G M E N T
_______________
Stuart-Moore, VP (giving the judgment of the Court):
Introduction
1. On 6 November 2002, the applicants (D1 and D2 respectively) were convicted by a jury on the four counts jointly alleged against them, following a trial in the Court of First Instance before Deputy Judge To. On 20 November 2002, D1 was sentenced to a total of 11 years’ imprisonment and D2 received an overall sentence of seven and a half years. They were each, in addition, disqualified to act as a director of a company for 15 years under section 168E of the Companies Ordinance, Cap. 32.2. D1 and D2 both sought leave to appeal against conviction. D1, additionally, sought leave to appeal against her sentence of imprisonment.
3. We can say at the outset that although this application was concerned with five grounds of appeal with which counsel had, in advance, very sensibly worked out a division of labour so that the same arguments were not repeated, there is, we consider, only one ground of any real substance. This related to the directions given by the judge on the standard of proof. Nonetheless, one of the other grounds requires an insight into the background of the case and it is necessary, therefore, to deal with this aspect before turning to the main ground of appeal.
The indictment
4. The first count on the indictment alleged forgery, contrary to section 71 of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap. 200. The particulars were that D1 and D2, between 1 February 1999 and 20 February 1999:5. In the second count, contrary to section 73 of the same ordinance, charging D1 and D2 with using the false instruments set out in count 1, it was alleged that on or about 20 February 1999 they did so knowing or believing them to be false and with the same dual intention as expressed in the first count.“…. made false instruments, namely documents of International Wisdom & Mercy VDA S.A. consisting of four minutes of meetings of the board of directors, two written resolutions of the shareholders and two declarations of the directors and shareholders, all dated the 9th day of February 1999 in relation to a first and second mortgage on the property known as 22 Kent Road, Kowloon Tong, Kowloon, Hong Kong, with the intention that they should use them to induce somebody to accept them as genuine, and by reason of so accepting them, to do some act, or not to do some act, to his or her own or another person’s prejudice.” (Appeal bundle pp. 1-2)
6. Counts 3 and 4 both alleged that D1 and D2 had procured the execution of a valuable security, contrary to section 22(2) of the Theft Ordinance, Cap. 210. Count 3’s particulars were that between 1 February 1999 and 31 March 1999, they dishonestly and with a view to gain for themselves or another or with intent to cause loss to another:
7. The particulars of count 4 were the same as set out in count 3 except that the borrower was described as P&T Motors (China) Limited (“PTM”).“…. procured from the Sin Hua Bank Limited (the Bank) the execution of a valuable security, namely a mortgage dated the 1st day of March 1999 between the Bank as mortgagee and International Wisdom & Mercy VDA S.A. (the company) as mortgagor with Tacglory Limited as borrower by deception, namely by falsely representing that the company and its directors and shareholders had approved the use of the property known as 22 Kent Road, Kowloon Tong, Kowloon, Hong Kong, as security to the Bank for credit facilities granted or to be granted to Tacglory Limited.” (Appeal bundle p. 3)
Prosecution’s case
8. Adopting in large measure the helpful summary of the case for the prosecution which has been prepared on behalf of the respondent by Mr Simon Tam, the events which formed the background to this case began in October 1995. At that time, Mr Lau Pak-hun made $62.8 million available to a religious organisation known as International Wisdom Mercy VDA S.A. (“IWM”). Its purpose was for the purchase of a property at 22 Kent Road, Kowloon Tong (“the Property”), in order that it could be used as a museum to promote the teaching of his Mizong master, Yi Yunggao (“Master Yi”), and as a meeting place for Master Yi’s disciples in Hong Kong. IWM had three shareholders, namely, Mr Lau, Tse Kit-ha (PW2) and D1, and the Property was held in trust for Mr Lau. There were ten directors who included the three shareholders.9. D1 became a highly trusted disciple of Master Yi and acted as his representative in Hong Kong. However, in April 1997, about 18 months after the acquisition of the Property, D1’s younger brother, D2, who was neither a follower of Master Yi nor affiliated with IWM, attempted to offer the Property to the Sin Hua Bank (“the Bank”) as a security for obtaining banking facilities for his companies, Tacglory Limited (“Tacglory”) and PTM. In the event, this came to nothing.
10. Neither Tacglory nor PTM had any connection with the religious organisation to which D1 belonged. D1 and D2 were directors and shareholders of Tacglory. D2 and Tacglory were also directors and shareholders of PTM, and hence D1, through her interest in Tacglory, also had an interest in PTM.
11. Towards the end of 1998, the Bank reviewed the banking facilities to these companies and demanded additional security. Again this came to nothing, but, in early 1999, D2 again offered the Property as security to the Bank to obtain a credit facility for Tacglory. In short, this was achieved by using the eight documents purportedly signed by Mr Lau, PW2, D1 and some of the other directors. The documents formed the subject matter of the 1st and 2nd counts. The Bank then executed the two mortgages, the subject of the 3rd and 4th counts.
12. In July 1999, relations between Master Yi and his Hong Kong disciples turned sour. In essence, it was believed that he had acted fraudulently and also inappropriately in a number of other ways. Accordingly, it was resolved that the museum would be closed and that IWM would be disbanded.
13. On 18 September 1999, IWM passed a resolution to transfer the Property to Mr Lau. The meeting also authorised D1 to effect the transfer. It was after D1 had failed to carry out this task that the other directors and shareholders discovered for the first time that the Property had been mortgaged to the Bank as security for the banking facilities given to Tacglory and PTM. For his part, Mr Lau, who had been led by D1 to believe that D2 had a listed company and was a person of means, told D2 that he had never consented to the mortgage of the Property. In response, D2 remained motionless. Mr Lau suggested a solution to the problem by offering to pay $20 million leaving D2 to pay the balance of the sum to redeem the Property. The amount Mr Lau had offered to pay was fixed on the basis that the Property had been mortgaged for a total of $40 million and this went halfway. His concern was the damage that might otherwise be done to the religious organisation by the disgrace this incident could bring to its name. D2 replied that that could not be done as there were binding contracts between IWM and the two companies, Tacglory and PTM.
14. The matter was eventually reported to the Independent Commission Against Corruption (“ICAC”) after civil proceedings had been commenced.
15. Amongst the documents seized by ICAC from the Bank were the minutes of what purported to be meetings of IWM’s directors recording the resolutions of the shareholders and the declarations of the directors and shareholders of IWM approving the mortgage of the Property. These were all dated 9 February 1999. The prosecution’s case was that these documents (Exhibits P4 and P5) were either signed by the relevant directors and shareholders in blank form or were signed with no more than the standard preamble used for recording the minutes of meetings thereon and that, thereafter, resolutions had been added purporting to execute Deeds of Mortgage. It was alleged that D1 and D2 caused Exhibits P4 and P5 to be created so that these resolutions and other details could later be added to them. Needless to say, when the documents were signed in more or less blank form, they were intended by all the signatories except D1, IWM’s chairman, to be used for the legitimate affairs of IWM. The evidence clearly established that whatever else the documents might have been used for, they were not intended for the purpose of mortgaging the company’s property and that the relevant directors and shareholders, apart from D1, would not have signed the documents if they had known they were going to be used in this way.
Defence case
16. Neither of the applicants gave evidence. However, both of them replied to questions they were asked in interview by ICAC officers.17. D1’s defence at trial was presented on the basis of the answers she had provided in interview. D1 claimed that prior to July 1999, Mr Lau, PW2 and the other directors who signed the documents were devoted disciples of Master Yi and that they would have done anything for him. More specifically, they would sign any document Master Yi told them to. Accordingly, they signed the documents on the instructions of Master Yi, which D1 had transmitted to them, knowing that the documents were mortgage documents and in the full knowledge of what it was that they were being asked to sign. In relation to the 1st and 2nd counts, it was said that the documents were not forgeries and, in regard to counts 3 and 4, D1 asserted that there had been no deception.
18. D2’s case was also presented on the answers he gave at his interview. He said that he had acted at the request of his sister (D1), to raise $5 million for IWM at the bidding of Master Yi. He relied on what he was told by D1 as well as on the documents she supplied to him. D2 claimed to have had no knowledge of any forgery or deception, saying that if the documents were forgeries, he had not acted dishonestly.
19. The defence did not dispute that the applicants had jointly procured the Bank’s execution of the mortgage deeds by the use of Exhibits P4 and P5. It was claimed that after the Hong Kong disciples discovered that Master Yi was effectively a fraud, they levelled the blame at D1 because she had been closest to him and had acted as his Hong Kong representative. The disciples felt cheated out of large sums of money by Master Yi which they could not recover but, as the Property had been purchased with Mr Lau’s donation, this at least was still available. Mr Lau, it was alleged, had insisted that the Property should be returned to him and he had agreed to sell the Property so that the losses suffered by the Hong Kong disciples could be partly restored to them. For this reason, it was suggested, the Hong Kong disciples turned against D1 because of the benefit they hoped to gain from the sale of the Property. When D1 was unable to transfer the Property to Mr Lau, it was alleged that Mr Lau reported the matter to the ICAC in order to pressurise D1 into satisfying the civil claim against her.
The evidence
20. The first main category of evidence at trial came from the two shareholders apart from D1 and five other directors of IWM, all of whom testified that they had not signed the minutes of meetings of directors containing the resolutions of shareholders and the declarations of shareholders and directors, in the form which appears in Exhibits P4 and P5. Although it was accepted that their signatures appeared on those documents, they said that they had known nothing about the contents and had not given their consent for the Property to be used for the benefit of Tacglory and PTM. Evidence was also given by Sek Wai-tong (PW10), the accountant used by IWM, who said that he had not prepared the minutes resolving to mortgage the Property.21. The second main category of evidence came from bankers and lawyers who handled the mortgage of the Property. The lawyers acting on behalf of the Bank made it a condition of the mortgage that at least four directors should sign the minutes and that all three shareholders should sign the resolutions approving the use of the company’s property as security for the credit facilities of Tacglory and PTM.
22. Other evidence of considerable importance at trial came from an expert document examiner whose evidence was not seriously challenged. His findings went to prove that the documents (Exhibits P4 and P5) were false in the sense that later additions had been made to them.
23. As we have said already, there was a further category of evidence which related to the interviews of the applicants which provided the basis on which their cases were presented.
Grounds of appeal (conviction)
(1) Standard of Proof
24. In what we consider to have been the principal ground of appeal, it was submitted that the judge’s directions on the standard of proof were materially erroneous in that they:(i) incorporated an attempt to define a ‘reasonable doubt’; and
(ii) may have left the jury with the impression that a doubt about the guilt of a defendant was to be disregarded if it was “fanciful, stupid or ridiculous” and that guilt did not need to be proved to a “mathematical certainty”.25. In the early part of the summing up, the judge gave the following directions which contain the passages about which the complaint in this ground of appeal is directed. He said:
“Secondly, the standard of proof. The prosecution must prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused person is guilty of the offence with which they are charged, before you can convict them. A reasonable doubt is precisely what it says, a reasonable doubt as opposed to a fanciful, stupid or ridiculous doubt. Prosecution does not have to prove the guilt of an accused to a mathematical certainty. Human affairs do not lend themselves to that degree of certainty, but the prosecution has to prove to your satisfaction, so that you feel sure that the accused is guilty…..” (Appeal bundle p. 19)Immediately following this, the judge went on to say:
“It is only then, would it be your duty to convict. This is a very high standard; unless you are sure of his guilt beyond all reasonable doubt, it would be your duty to acquit. It is not enough for the prosecution to establish that there are very strong suspicious circumstances involving the accused person, or that he or she is probably guilty. If, having considered all the evidence, you are left in a reasonable doubt, then you must acquit the accused, because prosecution has failed to discharge its burden.
In the course of my summing-up, you may hear me saying ‘proved’, ‘conclude’, ‘find’, ‘believe’ or ‘satisfy’ etc. These words are all to be read as if they are followed by the words ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’. I may sometimes leave them out because it is too repetitive or sometimes by a slip of the tongue, but remember the concept beyond all reasonable doubt is there and always there when I use those words.” (Appeal bundle p. 19)26. It was contended that although this later direction and others in similar terms, to which we shall turn in due course, were unobjectionable in themselves, they were qualified by what had been said in the passages which are criticised. In particular, it was submitted that the judge had directed the jury in a way which, in the courts of Australia, has been found not merely to be undesirable but to have amounted to a fatal misdirection. Applying this jurisprudence to the present case, it was argued that these convictions must be quashed.
27. In Green v R [1971] 126 CLR 28, which Mr Grounds described as the seminal Australian case dealing with the point at issue, the High Court held that it was a misdirection to state that a reasonable doubt is confined to a “rational doubt” or a “doubt founded upon reason”. In that case, the trial judge had answered the rhetorical question he had posed, as to how the jury would know when they had reached the stage of being satisfied about something beyond a reasonable doubt, by directing them (in a passage which appears at pp. 30-31) that:
However, the directions did not end there and, when later the court (at p. 32) went on to say that it was “unable to feel any confidence as to what (the jury) would understand by the totality of what the judge told them”, it was the further direction which was described as being the “dominant impression” with which the jury would have been left. This direction (at p. 31) was in these terms:“…. it is when you have reached the stage that you either have no doubt at all, because if you have got no doubt at all you must have got rid of all reasonable doubts; or if there is some thing nagging in the back of your mind which makes you hesitate as to whether you are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, you have got to try and take it out and identify this thing which is causing the hesitation, causing the doubt if you like, and you have a look at it and you try to assess it and you say to yourself is this doubt that is bothering me, does it proceed from reason; is it a rational doubt; is it something which raises a really sensible doubt; or is it a fantastic sort of doubt; is it something which arises from some prejudice that I may have; some quite unreasonable fear that I might go wrong; some perhaps reluctance to make an unpleasant finding. Well, if it is one of those doubts – merely one of those doubts, then of course it cannot be described as reasonable because it does not come from reason; it comes from something which is emotional or irrational or – at any rate it is not based upon reason, and if you have had a look at what is bothering you and you decide that it does proceed from something which is not reason but something fantastic or rising out of prejudice or one of these other things, then you should say to yourself, ‘The only doubt I’ve got is one which is not based on reason, I have therefore got rid of all doubts which are not based in reason, and the result of that is that I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, because the only things that are worrying me are things which I now assess after looking at them as not based in reason.’”
“And of course it is a commonsense point of view before you find anybody guilty of a crime like this, you do need to feel comfortable about it; you do need to feel, ‘Very well, I’ve considered everything and I’m really satisfied. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt; I have given it the best consideration I can.’ There it is. And then you go away from the court and you are comfortable, and that is the way you ought to be. You might not enjoy it, but you will nevertheless be comfortable, and unless you can make a decision of guilt and feel comfortable that it is the right decision, well then you do not make it.”The court made the point that although later in the summing up the trial judge had made references to the need to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, these were “controlled” by the way the judge had expressed the definition in the passages we have just cited. The judgment also set out a number of earlier admonitions which had been issued to judges in other criminal trials “to adhere to and not to attempt needless explanations of the classical statement of the nature of the onus of proof resting on the Crown” and went on (at p. 32) to say that it was “remarkable that in this instance the learned judge, undeterred by the failures of illustrious predecessors, has made a new endeavour to explain that which requires no explanation and to improve upon the traditional formula”. The court went on to say, when allowing the appeal, that “so far from succeeding where they did not, he has, in our opinion, not only confused the jury but misdirected them”. The judgment (at pp. 32-34) continued as follows:
“…. the direction was in our opinion fundamentally erroneous. A reasonable doubt is a doubt which the particular jury entertain in the circumstances. Jurymen themselves set the standard of what is reasonable in the circumstances. It is that ability which is attributed to them which is one of the virtues of our mode of trial: to their task of deciding facts they bring to bear their experience and judgment. They are both unaccustomed and not required to submit their processes of mind to objective analysis of the kind proposed in the language of the judge in this case. ‘It is not their task to analyse their own mental processes’: Windeyer J., Thomas v. The Queen ([1960] 102 CLR, at p. 606). A reasonable doubt which a jury may entertain is not to be confined to a ‘rational doubt’, or a ‘doubt founded on reason’ in the analytical sense or by such detailed processes as those proposed by the passage we have quoted from the summing up. Yet that is what they were directed to do in this case.
But the error, in our opinion, does not end there. If the jury could get any clear picture from the trial judge’s directions, we think the predominant impression they would take to the jury room would be that a comfortable satisfaction of the accused’s guilt would be enough to warrant conviction. It seems to us that the language used in this portion of the summing up equated satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt with that comfortable satisfaction felt by persons who have done their best and depart self-satisfied with their efforts. Such a standard of conduct on the part of a jury in a criminal trial would in our opinion be a denial of that traditional solicitude for certainty expressed in the traditional formula as to the onus of proof.
If during the course of a trial, particularly in his address to the jury, counsel for the accused has laboured the emphasis on the onus of proof to such a degree as to suggest to the minds of the jury that possibilities which are in truth fantastic or completely unreal ought by them to be regarded as affording a reason for doubt, it would be proper and indeed necessary for the presiding judge to restore, but to do no more than restore, the balance. In such a case the judge can properly instruct the jury that fantastic and unreal possibilities ought not to be regarded by them as the source of reasonable doubt. In the passage which we have quoted from the summing up in this case the trial judge did alert the jury to the impropriety of acting upon such possibilities. We do not know whether counsel for the accused had actually sought to influence the jury in an inadmissible way calling for the judge’s intervention. But in any case as we have indicated the judge did not confine his remarks to restoring a proper balance in the mind of the jury. Cf. Thomas v. The Queen, per Windeyer J. ([1960] 102 CLR at p. 605).
Lastly on this aspect of the summing up, the language of the trial judge was calculated to lessen the sense of responsibility of the jury in the sense in which that expression was used by Isaacs and Rich JJ. in Hicks v. The King ([1920] 28 CLR 36 at p. 46). It seems to us that its clear tendency apart from its obfuscation and inaccuracy was to blunt the jury’s proper sense of reluctance to act whilst what they might consider a reasonable doubt had not been removed. In our opinion, the jury were not properly instructed as to the onus of proof. For that reason alone there must be a new trial. See Thomas v. The Queen ([1960] 102 CLR 584).”28. It is to be noted that whilst the court in Green v R stated this to be an appeal related to the ‘onus of proof’, it is clear that the issue which was addressed was the criminal standard of proof. However, our attention was additionally drawn to other leading Australian cases on the standard of proof. We were, amongst others, referred to R v Flesch & McKenzie [1986] 24 A.Crim.R. 290 where the Court of Criminal Appeal in New South Wales, when allowing the appeal, held that ordinarily it is desirable for trial judges to use the commonly recognised form of direction on proof beyond reasonable doubt, without development or analysis and that a lengthy development, which occurred in that case, will almost always lead to a situation where there is a risk that the jury will be left confused.
29. In a much later case to which we were taken, R v Krasniqi [1993] 69 A.Crim.R. 383, the South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal reviewed a number of earlier decisions on the point at issue, including R v Green, when concluding (at p. 391) that the summing up included an “undesirable elaboration on the burden of proof” but the court stated (at pp. 391-392):
30. The analysis of a doubt had occurred in R v Wilson & Ors [1986] 22 A.Crim.R. 130 where the trial judge had directed the jury (at p. 132): “If you think there is a doubt but that is merely a fanciful doubt, you will still convict because that is not a reasonable doubt: it is a doubt beyond reason”. The Court of Criminal Appeal, South Australia, having considered R v Green (above) held by a majority that:“…. the jury has not been directed to analyse doubt. They were not carried past the point of reaching doubt. The learned trial judge told the jury that fanciful or fantastic suppositions or possibilities are not doubts. He did not postulate, or give the appearance of postulating, the existence of some doubt and tell the jury to decide whether the doubt was fanciful or fantastic. He did not leave room for analysis in that sense.”
“… the direction in the present case was radically defective. It went further than merely to warn the jury against being influenced by fanciful or unreasonable possibilities or notions. The judge said: ‘If you think there is a doubt but that it is merely a fanciful doubt, you will still convict because that is not a reasonable doubt.’ This direction postulates a doubt about guilt which the jury thinks exists. It then invites them to subject their mental state to examination in order to determine whether the doubt about guilt which they think to exist, is to be characterised as fanciful or reasonable. That direction is a negation of the proposition of which Green’s case is authority that the test of whether a doubt is reasonable is whether the jury entertains it in the circumstances.
I think that a direction in the terms given in the present case has a dangerous tendency to produce in the minds of the jurors an impression that a view held by them that there is a doubt about guilt is to be disregarded unless it passes some further test; that there must be some particular degree of doubt or even that a slight doubt is to be disregarded. When jurors are invited to consider whether a doubt which they actually think to exist is fanciful, they may well interpret the invitation as one, not merely to exclude aberrant mental processes, but to put aside real doubts unless those doubts possess in their minds a certain degree of strength. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires that doubts, irrespective of degree of strength which they attain, be given effect to if the jurors, as reasonable persons, are prepared to entertain them.”31. Seen in isolation, it might be said that the judge in the present case had offended in the way which gave rise to criticism in R v Wilson and Ors. Nevertheless, this is an aspect which, in our opinion, should be viewed in its full context. We shall return to this in due course.
32. In R v Goncalves [1997] A.Crim.R. 193, the Court of Criminal Appeal, Western Australia, dealt with an appeal which has relevance in the present context to the other words which are criticised in the summing up. There, a trial judge had directed the jury that reasonable doubt was: “not proof to the point of absolute certainty. It’s simply what the words say, ‘beyond reasonable doubt’”. The court held, when dismissing the appeal, that whilst this was an undesirable direction, the remark in its proper context could not be said to have misled the jury. Malcolm CJ (at p. 196) said:
“In my opinion, the direction in this case did not suffer from either of the vices in Green, although the elaboration of the point by the learned trial judge was clearly undesirable. In my opinion, by saying that proof beyond reasonable doubt was not proof ‘to the point of absolute certainty’, the learned judge was telling the jury that proof beyond reasonable doubt did not mean proof beyond any doubt whatsoever. From the way in which it was put, I am of the opinion that it remained for the jury to determine whether any doubt they had was a reasonable doubt. In that sense, the direction excluded an approach which would have been wrong and emphasised to the jury that if they had any doubt they would have to determine whether it was reasonable.”33. Returning to the case presently before us, Mr Tam has at all times realistically accepted that the judge had commented on the standard of proof in ways which were, with respect, unwise. This is borne out by the Specimen Directions issued to judges in this jurisdiction which sets out the model direction on the standard of proof in these terms:
“How does the prosecution succeed in proving the defendant’s guilt? The answer is – by making you sure of it. Nothing less than that will do. If after considering all the evidence you are sure that the defendant is guilty, you must return a verdict of ‘Guilty’. If you are not sure, your verdict must be ‘Not Guilty’.”Attached to this direction is a helpful footnote which indicates that it is normally unnecessary to use the phrase ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, but that where counsel have adopted the phrase during the trial it is desirable to give the direction:
“The prosecution must make you sure of guilt, which is the same as proving the case beyond reasonable doubt.”The point is also made in the same footnote that the Court of Appeal in England has cautioned against any attempt at a more elaborate definition of being ‘sure’ or of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.
34. The modern position in England and Wales dates back to Walters v R [1969] 2 AC 26. The developments on this topic since that time are well summarised in Archbold [2004] at paras. 4-384/5.
35. In Hong Kong, Kempster JA, in R v Lee Yuk-wah & Ors, CACC 467/1984 (unreported), described a “plethora of applications” following the decision in R v Yeung Kuen-chi & Anor, CACC 266/1984 where this court held that the following direction was misleading and wrong:
36. The judgment in Lee Yuk-wah & Ors, to which we were not unfortunately referred by counsel in argument, made reference to R v Ngan Chun-yee & Ors, CACC 137/1984, R v Wong Leung, CACC 517/1984 and R v Peter Li Kwok-sui & Anor, CACC 292/1984. In all of those cases, it was, as Kempster JA said:“There is a burden on the Crown to prove every element of these charges and the Crown must do so beyond (a) reasonable doubt. It cannot do so to a hundred percent certainty. This is not possible, but you must, in other words, be sure.”
37. In Lee Yuk-wah & Ors, complaint was made about the direction given to the jury that they did not “have to be certain of a defendant’s guilt before you can convict him. Few things are certain in this uncertain world and you can’t be certain in a mathematical sense in any case”. The court accepted that, but for two decisions in the Privy Council, it was bound by the decision in Yeung Kuen-chi & Anor. Those decisions arose from Walters v R (above) and Ferguson v R [1979] 1 All ER 877 and Kempster JA’s judgment deals with each of them in these terms:“…. held that unfortunate elaborations by reference, for example, to ‘mathematical certainty’ not markedly different from that impugned in Yeung, had not, having regard to subsequent references to reasonable doubt, misled the relevant juries.”
“7. In Walters a direction referring to ‘absolute certainty’(which is) substantially similar to that complained of in the instant applications was upheld. The word ‘absolute’ is no more than surplusage and no distinction is to be made between certainty and mathematical certainty. In Ferguson Lord Scarman said at p. 882:
‘The time-honoured formula is that the jury must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt. As Dickson C.J. said in Dawson v. The Queen ([1961] 106 CLR 1) at p. 18, attempts to substitute other expressions have never prospered. It is generally sufficient and safe to direct a jury that they must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt so that they feel sure of the defendant’s guilt. Nevertheless other words will suffice so long as the message is clear. In the present case the jury could have been under no illusion. The importance of being sure was repeatedly emphasized.’
Although Deputy Judge Hopkinson did not emphasize the importance of being sure he repeatedly stressed the importance of being satisfied beyond reasonable doubt which, to quote my lord Barker, J.A. in Yeung:
‘are simple English words and experience shows that juries are capable of understanding them without explanation.’
38. It was made clear in the concluding words of Lord Diplock’s judgment (at p. 31) in Walters v R (above), with which we respectfully agree, that it is “the effect of the summing up as a whole that matters”. With these words in mind, Mr Tam reminded us that in numerous places during the summing up, the judge had correctly and succinctly dealt with the standard of proof. We shall take some of these in turn.8. I am satisfied that the jury here was made well aware of the required standard of proof. Nonetheless I would express the hope that all judges in this jurisdiction will heed the helpful guidance in relation to directions on the standard of proof to be found in Fergusonand in Yeung.”
39. There were two passages shortly before the directions which are criticised. When dealing with the burden of proof, the judge said:
“I shall now remind you about a cardinal principle in criminal law, which I am sure you are now very familiar with because that has been repeated to you time and again by counsel, but it is my duty to repeat it to you again. I have already mentioned that an accused is presumed innocent until the prosecution has satisfied you of his guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. This means firstly, the burden of proving the guilt of an accused rests upon the prosecution throughout the entire trial from beginning to end. This burden never shifts. There is no burden on the accused to prove anything, let alone his innocence. Remember, it is for the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused; the accused is not required to prove his innocence.” (Appeal bundle p. 18)Then, immediately afterwards, when the judge was explaining that the applicants had no obligation to give evidence, he said:
A little later, after the passage (cited above at paragraph 25) which was criticised, and, importantly, the passage which contains a model direction on the standard of proof and its impact on the approach the jury should take in the event that a reasonable doubt was raised, the judge said:“…. they are presumed innocent unless the prosecution has satisfied you of their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Appeal bundle p. 19)
Shortly afterwards, in the context of a ‘lies’ direction to which we shall have to return later under another ground of appeal, the judge said :“Does what defence counsel suggests in the totality of the evidence raise any reasonable doubt in your minds about the prosecution’s case. In coming to that conclusion, I would remind you once again that you should apply your common-sense derived from your experience as men and women of this society.” (Appeal bundle p. 20)
Later, when defining the elements of forgery the judge said :“Convict him or her only if you are satisfied so that you are sure on the whole of the evidence, including what they said in their recorded interview, that he or she is guilty of the charge.” (Appeal bundle p. 22)
40. It is not without significance that experienced counsel who separately appeared at trial on behalf of D1 and D2 indicated no issues of any concern after the judge had enquired, at the end of the first day of his summing up, whether there were any matters they wished to raise.“… if you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the instruments are false, then you shall acquit the accused, not only of this count but also of all the other counts.” (Appeal bundle p. 28)
41. Perhaps in fairness to the judge, whilst in no sense is this to be taken as offering encouragement for the formula he chose to adopt in the passages which are criticised, it may be that he considered that the phraseology of D1’s trial counsel in his final speech called for something to be said over and above the usual direction given for the standard of proof beyond the words usually adopted to. Counsel had said as follows:
Similar phraseology was repeated by the same counsel later (at p. 169). If these words triggered the judge’s decision to add to the specimen direction on the standard of proof, we do not, with respect, consider that they justified a departure from the usual direction.“You can’t say, ‘Well, she sounds guilty to me’ or ‘I think she’s guilty.’ It’s not enough. You’ve got to be sure. You’ve got to be able to walk out of this courtroom, having found her guilty, knowing that at no time in the future, in your life, will you ever ask yourself the question, ‘I wonder if she really was guilty.’ Because if you found her guilty and walked out of the court and at some later stage asked yourself that question, then you would not have been satisfied beyond reasonable doubt when you found her guilty.” (Appeal bundle p. 155)
42. The impugned words used by the judge when he was giving the standard of proof directions have to be looked at in their full context. We do not consider, in the present circumstances, that the judge’s direction that “a fanciful, stupid or ridiculous doubt” or his reference to proof not having to reach the standard of “mathematical certainty”, unwise though those words undoubtedly were, could have led to any confusion on the jury’s part. It was made abundantly plain that the jury had to feel sure of guilt if they were to convict. The offending words, which form no part of the normal directions given to juries on the standard of proof, were immediately followed by the exhortation that the jury should feel sure of guilt. The jury were told that this was a very high standard and that unless they were sure of guilt beyond all reasonable doubt, it was their duty to acquit. The judge followed this by telling the jury in terms that suspicious circumstances or probable guilt were not enough.
43. In the light of our conclusion, we do not need to dwell at any length with the further contentions made by Mr Grounds that a misdirection on the ‘standard of proof’ might also have affected the jury’s approach to the ‘inferences’ which might be drawn from the evidence or to the issue of dishonesty alleged against D2 in counts 3 and 4.
44. All we need to say in regard to the ancillary submissions, which were effectively dependent on the principal ground succeeding, is that they added nothing of substance to the matters with which we have already dealt. The judge went to considerable lengths to sum up the defence which had been presented to the jury without, of course, the benefit of evidence from either of the applicants. Despite this, Mr Grounds submitted that D2 “may have stupidly believed or trusted his sister (D1) or there may have been an element of stupidity or ridiculousness or mathematical uncertainty involved which was capable of raising a doubt” in the jury’s approach to his defence and the issue of dishonesty. There was, however, no hint or suggestion in the papers before us that D2 suffered from stupidity or anything approaching it and such considerations would have been entirely speculative.
(2) Lies
45. Counsel for D1 and D2, as well as Mr Tam for the respondent, were agreed that a direction on ‘lies’ was not strictly required in present circumstances. Counsel accepted that this was a case which fitted the position described in HKSAR v Mo Shiu-shing [1999] 1 HKC 43 at p. 57 where the judgment reads:For our part, we can well understand why the judge chose out of an abundance of caution to give a ‘lies’ direction in view of the gulf which lay between the prosecution and the defence. Again, adopting the judgment in Mo Shiu-shing (at p. 57):“… where an allegation has simply been made against the defendant that he has been lying, this subject can be dealt with by the judge directing the jury in terms that this is an issue which relates solely to credibility, that is, that it is for the jury to decide whose evidence they believe. In such circumstances, no more needs to be said.”
“(2) Where there is a danger that the jury may believe that lying goes to proof of guilt, usually because the prosecutor has alleged that the defendant has lied and has addressed the jury upon the basis that the lie is supportive of the prosecution case, a twofold warning should be given to the effect that:
(a) lies can never prove guilt in themselves; and
(b) that persons may lie for reasons other than guilt.
46. Nevertheless, it was submitted, as a further ground of appeal, that the judge, having decided to give a direction on lies, had misdirected the jury on that issue by leaving open the danger that the jury would misuse lies as evidence probative of guilt.This last direction will need to be accompanied by the possible ‘innocent’ reasons that are usually given as examples in a standard direction as to why a person facing an allegation of crime might lie.”
47. The directions given by the judge about lies were in these terms:
“You have seen the video interview of the two accused; they gave you an account of how the events happened. If, having listened to the accused’s account in the video-recording, you come to the conclusion that he or she had at some stage told you lies, you must not convict him or her simply for that reason; because people tell lies for reasons other than that they are guilty. Perhaps because they think the truth is unconvincing or out of confusion or out of panic or to protect someone else, or because they are ashamed of their behaviour that might fall short of committing a criminal offence.
48. The specific complaint made in this ground was that these directions did not go far enough. The judge had not stated that lies in themselves could not prove guilt and he did not go on to say, in the suggested formula set out in Mo Shiu-shing (at p. 58):That is not an exhaustive list of reasons why people tell lies, but it may help you to understand more clearly that people do tell lies sometimes for reasons other than that they are guilty. So, do not convict the accused simply because you think he was telling lies in the interview. Convict him or her only if you are satisfied so that you are sure on the whole of the evidence including what they said in their recorded interview, that he or she is guilty of the charge.” (Appeal bundle p. 22)
49. However, whilst the compliant as it stands may have some force, it cannot be viewed in isolation. The jury were not pouring over the written words of the summing up to scrutinise under a spotlight every nuance of each stage as it proceeded. They were able to hear the whole of the summing up before beginning their deliberations and, in the latter part of the summing up, the judge returned to this issue in a context where it was specifically relevant to the subject-matter with which he was dealing. When referring to some of the answers D1 had given in her interview which prosecuting counsel had submitted were lies, the judge was at pains to remind the jury that even though they might find her to have been lying, this was not a sufficient reason to convict her. He reminded the jury that lies might be told for reasons other than guilt and he said, for the first time, that lies could not in themselves prove guilt. It was, in addition to the passages cited earlier in relation to the principal ground of appeal, emphasised again that the jury had to be satisfied of guilt beyond all reasonable doubt before they could convict.“If you think that there is, or may be, an innocent explanation for his lies then you should take no notice of them. It is only if you are sure that he did not lie for an ‘innocent’ reason that his lies can be regarded by you as evidence which supports the prosecution’s case.”
50. Mr Tam submitted that the ‘lies’ directions, taken overall, provided a clear message in circumstances where, at trial, counsel for D1 had alleged that Mr Lau and PW2 to PW5 had been lying while prosecuting counsel had said that the applicants had been lying in their interviews. D2’s case was that he had relied on what he was told by D1. The judge’s directions, it was submitted, removed the potential danger of the jury thinking that a defendant who had lied must be guilty.
51. In the first of these later directions, as all counsel accepted, it was not entirely clear what the judge was meaning to say in relation to D1 albeit there appears, in our view, to have been nothing contained in the passage which was prejudicial to her. The judge said:
“I remind you what I said earlier. Even though you find (D1) lying, that is not a sufficient reason to convict her, because a person may lie for reasons other than that she is guilty. You have to be satisfied of her guilt beyond reasonable doubt before you could convict her. Now, do the lies you find in the interview help you to remove any doubt, if what she said at the interview could be true? This is a matter for you.
Later, again, when the judge was itemising areas of dispute, he said:(Counsel for D2) has taken you through the video interview of the 2nd accused. The crux of his submission is that what the 2nd accused said is consistent with what the 1st accused said in the interview. Now, for that purpose, it does not matter if what the accused said in an interview was found to be untrue, because the defence of the 2nd accused was that he was acting on what he was told by the 1st accused. So, that would not damage the 2nd accused’s case.” (Appeal bundle p. 75)
As we have already said, the judge had in fact omitted to say earlier that lies could not in themselves prove guilt. In this sense it was not a ‘reminder’, but the judge went on later to say:“… Now, I remind you what I said earlier about lies; lies can never prove guilt in themselves, and that persons may lie for reasons other than (that) they are guilty. …” (Appeal bundle p. 79)
“… As against the 1st accused, you have the evidence of the lies she told about the documents and how they came to be created. Again, I remind you that lies can never prove guilt and a person may lie for reasons other than she is guilty. So, ask yourselves whether in the light of all the circumstances, she knew the documents were forgeries.
52. We consider that the directions given by the judge were adequate in all the circumstances. Nothing more needed to be said and, to answer the point raised in this ground, nothing, in our opinion, was said by the judge which could have led the jury to infer guilt merely from lies.Again, the 2nd accused, he has not been shown to have told you lies about how the documents came to be created. He stated that he did not know, he has no knowledge. So, ask yourselves whether in the light of the circumstances, he knew the documents were forger(ies). …” (Appeal bundle p. 81)
(3) Dishonesty
53. The next ground of appeal with which we shall deal impugned the judge’s directions on dishonesty by, amongst other things, “muddling” the defences of D1 and D2 and, in D2’s case, by directing the jury that they did not have to consider the second question in Ghosh when determining whether D2 had acted dishonestly.54. The judge, on the issue of dishonesty, had directed the jury as follows:
“Thirdly, dishonesty. On this issue you have to decide two questions. Firstly, was what the accused did or agreed to do, dishonest by the standard of reasonable and honest people? In this regard you, the jury, must form your own judgment of what those standards are. That is why you are called from your various inconveniences to come here to apply your everyday experience as reasonable members of the public and to exercise common-sense.
The second question is, must the accused themselves have realised that what they were doing or agreed to do would be regarded as dishonest by reasonable and honest people? In deciding this question, you must consider the accused own state of mind as at the time of the event. And counsel has reminded you the background that is, in February 1999. Counsel says (D1) acted under the spell of the master, and counsel says (D2) acted on the trust of the sister. This is something that you may consider.
This question has both a subjective and an objective element in it. It is not simply whether the accused themselves realised what they were doing was dishonest, it is not simply that. It is not simply whether under the spell of the master they did not realise what they were doing was dishonest. It is this; it is whether they must have realised that what they were doing or agreed to do, would be regarded as dishonest by reasonable and honest people.
So, I repeat, it is whether they must have realised what they were doing or agreed to do, would be regarded as dishonest by reasonable and honest people. I shall come back to this and give you more specific directions on the facts when I sum up the evidence to you in due course.” (Appeal bundle pp. 32-33)55. In this passage, it is plain that the judge’s reference to “they”, meaning both applicants, had been under Master Yi’s spell was a slip of the tongue. It was no doubt caused by the difficulty which had arisen, that D1, by virtue of her defence that she was acting under the spell of Master Yi, was entitled to a Ghosh direction whereas D2, who merely said that he honestly relied on his sister’s word, was not so entitled.
56. As Mr Tam submitted, a fair reading of the passage shows that the judge was directing the jury that they had to decide two questions on the issue of dishonesty. These arose from the two limbs of the well-known test in R v Ghosh [1982] 1 QB 1053 at 1064. When the judge returned to this issue, he said:
“I have told you that (the) prosecution must prove that what the accused have agreed to do was dishonest and you must decide two questions; firstly, was that the accused did by the standard of reasonable and honest people, dishonest? Now, you the jury must form your own judgment of what those standards are. As reasonable men and women of society, you must know what those standards are, apply those standards to the facts of this case as you found them, ask yourselves whether what the accused did was dishonest by the standard of reasonable and honest people; not by their own standard, by the standard of reasonable and honest people. Was it dishonest to present Exhibit P4 and P5 to the bank as IWM’s board meeting minutes and shareholders’ resolution when no such meeting had been held and no such resolution has been passed? This is a question for you.
If the answer is ‘Yes’, then the next question to consider is, must the accused themselves have realised that what they were doing or agreed to do – we are just concerned with what they were doing – would be regarded as dishonest by reasonable and honest people. Now, this question has both a subjective and an objective element in it. It is not simply whether the accused themselves thought that they were honest in so doing. It is whether they realised reasonable and honest people would regard it as dishonest to present those documents when there was no such board meeting held and when there was no such resolution passed.
Counsel rightly asked you to take into account the accused’s state of mind as at February 1999. For (D1), counsel said that she was acting under the spell of the master. Do you find that to be true or could possibly be true? If ‘Yes’, would she, while under that spell, consider it not dishonest to do what you found she did; that is, to present those documents as if there were board meetings and resolutions passed when in fact there was no.
Of course, if you do not find that she was acting under the spell of the master, then there is no need to ask yourselves this second question. You only ask this question if you think that she might be acting under the spell of the master.
For (D2), his position is different. He was not acting under the influence of the master. He was not a believer. He acted on the trust of his sister. Perhaps there is really no need for you to consider this second question.” (Appeal bundle pp. 82-83)57. In our judgment, the judge had dealt with this matter in a sensible fashion, having tailored his directions to the somewhat awkward situation which had arisen. It is apparent that he had not confused the separate nature of the cases presented by D1 and D2. All that we need to say on this issue is that in D1’s case, the Ghosh direction was a model of its kind and would not have been required in all probability if her defence had been presented on a different footing. So far as D2 was concerned, whilst it may be said that the judge was somewhat generous in giving D2 the benefit of a partial Ghosh direction, the fact is that as the jury had to be given such a direction in D1’s case, it was impractical to tell the jury wholly to ignore it in D2’s case.
(4) Admitted facts
58. Amongst the ‘Admitted Facts’ which trial counsel for both applicants and counsel for the prosecution had signed under section 65C of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Cap. 221, was the following:59. Mr Grounds, in a further ground of appeal, raised a matter which was never raised at trial and should never have been raised as a serious point in these proceedings. He alleged that as Exhibit P. 54 was a “mere sham” the exhibit should have been referred to as a document. To have referred to this as an “agreement” meant, he suggested, that the prosecution was bound by their admission that this was an agreement (as opposed to a sham).“17. On 26th July 2001 an agreement between IWM, Tacglory and P&T dated 12th January 1999 was found at Flat D, 6/F., 24-28 Yik Yam Street, Happy Valley, the home of D1, by the ICAC following a search of the premises. The agreement is produced as exhibit P54.” (Appeal bundle p. 13)
60. We do not propose to say more on this point than that a careful draftsman would no doubt have described Exhibit P. 54 as a “document described as an agreement”. However, no one at trial was under any misapprehension about it nor could they reasonably have been.
(5) Alternative basis of defence
61. In the final ground to which we need to make reference, it was submitted that the judge had failed to put to the jury a possible alternative basis on which the defence might be viewed. It was accepted in these proceedings that neither of the highly experienced counsel at trial had put forward any alternative basis for the defence but Mr Poon, for D1, argued at some length that the evidence had left an alternative defence open which the judge ought, in the proper exercise of his duty, to have explained to the jury.62. The ‘alternative defence’ which Mr Poon had in mind was that D1 may have believed that the other Hong Kong disciples would not have objected to the application for a mortgage on the Property, even though their consent was not sought or obtained, “as she had been instructed to act in this way by Master Yi …… D1 may also have believed that they would not have questioned her evenif she had just typed in the mortgages unilaterally”.
63. The respondent’s submission that there was no evidence in the court below to raise these issues is well-founded. There was no evidence of any kind to suggest that D1 might have believed that she was entitled to make use of false documents in order to deceive a bank into granting credit facilities to her or her brother’s companies. Mr Poon, despite repeated requests to indicate any material from which such a defence might spring, was unable to do so.
Conclusion (convictions)
64. Having regard to the matters raised under the principal ground of appeal in relation to the standard of proof, we shall grant leave. However, treating the hearing in each case as the appeal of D1 and D2, we dismiss their appeals against conviction.
Sentence
65. There remains for our consideration an application for leave to appeal against the sentence of eleven years’ imprisonment imposed on D1. No complaint was raised in relation to the additional order that she should be disqualified for fifteen years from acting as a director of a company under section 168E of the Companies Ordinance, Cap. 32, and this order will stand.66. The judge, when sentencing, correctly described D1 and D2 as having carried out a carefully planned fraud which had taken nearly two years to materialise. In early 1997, D1 and D2 arranged banking officers to view the Property on the pretext of raising a loan for IWM and later at the end of 1998 the Property was provided as security for credit facilities to Tacglory and PTM. The judge found that this was an elaborate fraud in which false corporate and banking documents were created and used to mortgage the Property of the religious body to which D1 belonged. The value of the Property was large and the Bank stood to lose a sizeable sum of money as the result of the fraud. $35 million was owed by Tacglory and another $58 million was owed by PTM to the Bank. D1 had shown no remorse for her wrongdoing, notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence against her.
67. These offences, as the judge commented, amounted not only to a fraud on the Bank but on IWM also. By their conduct, D1 and D2 had fraudulently mortgaged the Property. This had the effect of putting the interests of IWM at serious risk and deceiving the Bank into providing credit facilities which, in the event, resulted in the Bank sustaining substantial losses. Even on D1’s case, the mortgages were for $40 million.
68. We are asked to view this matter in effect as a fraud amounting to $40 million. As there has been no resolution so far to civil proceedings which are in progress, we propose, as the judge appears also to have done, to deal with the case on this basis.
69. Bearing in mind that D2 received a sentence of seven and a half years’ imprisonment, it was argued that this left a considerable disparity between his sentence and D1’s. Mr Poon submitted that whilst D1 may have made the whole venture possible and was deserving of a sentence no less than seven and a half years, a three-and-a-half-year difference between her sentence and that of her brother (D2) was too great.
70. We consider that this is a case which can properly be looked at as a whole. While there were four counts, the two sets of forged documents were used to obtain the two mortgage loans amounting to approximately $40 million. Had this been a single charge of theft of $40 million, which in effect this is, the sentence could have been no more than the statutory maximum of ten years for theft.
71. This was, so far as IWM was concerned, a considerable breach of trust on the part of D1. She was a shareholder and director who, behind the backs of the others, mortgaged the Property which was being held in trust for Mr Lau. This provides an aggravating factor which alone justified the judge in taking a much more serious view of D1’s role. Furthermore, as the judge remarked, D1 was the majority shareholder of Tacglory and must have stood to gain substantially from the fraud.
72. We derived little assistance from the large number of previous decisions of this count in other cases where large sums of money have been taken dishonestly by a variety of means. There are no guidelines for sentencing purposes and each case must be decided on its own facts. Having regard to the grave breach of her fiduciary duty towards the other shareholders and directors of IWM, and remembering that there has been no hint of remorse and no attempt to repay any part of the loss, we consider that a sentence of nine years’ imprisonment was appropriate for the criminality involved in D1’s conduct. In saying this, we are satisfied that a sentence of 11 years’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive.
73. Accordingly, we shall give leave and treating the hearing as the appeal, we allow the appeal to the extent that D1’s sentence is reduced by two years to nine years’ imprisonment on counts 1 and 2. The concurrent sentences of six years’ imprisonment on counts 3 and 4 will remain. All these sentences are to run concurrently, making nine years in all.
| (M. Stuart-Moore) | (Frank Stock) | (Michael Lunn) |
| Vice-President | Justice of Appeal | Judge of the Court of First Instance |
Mr Albert Poon and Mr Vincent Poon, instructed by Messrs K.Y. Woo & Co., for D1/Applicant.
Mr Christopher Grounds and Ms Lydia L.K. Sun, instructed by Messrs Chiu, Szeto & Cheng, for D2/Applicant.
新闻调查见底 第三世多杰羌佛
新闻调查见底 第三世多杰羌佛
2014-03-02
亚洲新闻周刊
2013 年第28 期的凤凰周刊，刊登了长达 10 页的内容，直接针对 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛进行无中生有的恶意诽谤。大幅篇章，把 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛说成宗教诈骗犯，其座下机构和弟子是其实现宗教诈骗的帮凶和同伙。而同一媒体集团的凤凰网也在网上发表诽谤文章附和。对于了解H.H 第三世多杰羌佛的人来说，会对此不实报道嗤之以鼻，根本一派胡言；但对于不了解的普通读者来说，会造 成十分恶劣的影响。人们会在阅读的同时，自然接受文章所传达的信息，从而会第一时间对文章报道的对象进行否定。过后也许有人通过理性的思考会感觉这里有问题，但是多数人应该不会主动去求证，也想不到像凤凰周刊这样有声望的媒体大幅刊登的竟然是彻底的欺世盗名的谎言。丘吉尔曾说：真相在穿鞋的时候，谎言已经满城跑了。凤凰周刊就是那个着急满城跑的。谎言经不起推敲和求证，最终 会被打回原形。笔者相信最好的表达方式，就是实话实说，任何人都有自己的智慧，即便一时被误导或蒙蔽，总有清醒并发现真相时候。本文会跟随凤凰周刊的报道顺序进行分析。针对其观点，笔者将提出合理质疑，并提供真实的情况。本文内容经过多人的协力，亲自调查到 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的第一手实际情况，所以真实而不怕考证。对于凤凰周刊所刊登的内容笔者会一一分析，个中曲直，自会分明。
一、 凤凰周刊为谁发言？
在进入一件件具体事情的分析之前，有必要做的工作是通过文章中的线索指向，客观以及符合逻辑地分析，寻找一个答案，凤凰周刊要做什么？这么做的真实用意到底何在？
从常理上讲，凤凰周刊这样大影响力的杂志在报导涉及宗教的严肃问题时，应该力求真实、可信和客观，但实际情况恰恰相反，文章充斥着侮辱性的描述和否定性的词汇，引导和暗示读者对报导对象产 生负面情绪。通篇没有真实的证据，也没有合理的分析和论述：有些事情是稍作调查研究就会求证到的事实，却没有调查；有些事情是早已经有的定论，却没有被采纳；有些事实是不容置疑的真相，比如 H.H 第三世多杰羌佛三十大类的成就、真实的证量和全世界范围内的荣誉却被故意抹杀。只有想当然的一面倒的言辞，根本没有采访或者提供任何机会给 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛一方各大宗派来说明相关问题，毫无一个正常新闻报导的合理流程。不但如此，连文章的作者 --- 特约撰稿人王佳亮的真 实身份都神秘莫测，是一个化名，一篇针对著名人物、重大事件的披露，作者竟然是隐身人，令人费解。世间万法，没有无因之果，也没无果之因。凤凰周刊的这篇文章，作者不实，证据不实，故意也是恶意败坏 H.H 第三世多杰羌佛的声誉，为了什么？如果是新闻人的从业道德，为揭露真相，那么文章的立意应该严肃认真、内容客观准确，也应该有真实的报道人，详实的采访记录，具体的事实和充分的证人证言，但这些凤凰周刊都不具备。既然不是出于新闻报导的本有职责，却大幅刊登不实言论，这样的行为只能让人得出一个结果：凤凰周刊是特别人物机构的喉舌，打击 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛，谁会这么做？
怀疑对象可以是官方和非官方。如果是官方，即有政府授意。如果是政府行为，考虑官方搜集各种资料的能力， 怎么会没有详实的信息、具体的证人证言披露？有官方的背景，作证的人一定大大方方，名正言顺。然而该文全文没有任何有力量的人和信息提供，而且通篇逻辑混乱，用词极不严谨，大肆诽谤，根本达不到替政府发言的资质。替政府发言应当合理合法，有严谨的阐述和详实的证据才行，否则损害政府的公信力是小事，而导致的是败坏政府的形象，所以这两篇诽谤文章根本不是官方授意。有些看过文章的人自以为是地揣测这是政府想要打击 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛，真实是中了圈套，冤枉了政府，无论是中央还是港府，都被冤枉。因为这篇文章的目的，就是隐藏了真正的主使人，而他们希望公众最好认为这是政府的行为，这篇文章的用心就是努力造势，发出的信息就是凤凰周刊发声打击 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛，是政府的意思。可惜真正的授意者功课做得不好，就是他们想做也做不到，原因很简单，他们就是政府的反对者，怎么可能了解政府的想法？不过想瞒天过海，能骗过就骗过，反正绝大多数看的人是不会求证的。可惜露出了太多的马脚，不需要费太多的力气，就会知道背后的人。当回头看到人民日报的人民网、新华社的新华网、国务院的中国网近日赞叹 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的文章时，就会清楚官方的授意可以排除，无论中央和港府都不是。那么就是非官方的行为了。如此的报道，凤凰周刊代表的一方如果说对 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛没有仇恨，是无法令人相信的。
什么人如此仇恨 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛呢？
从文章来看，与 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛有私人恩怨的，似乎就是所谓诈骗案的受害人 - 刘娟和刘百行，那么这个文章是代表他们吗？显然不是，对于凤凰周刊声明的诈骗案中的两个所谓受害人都公开声明没有被骗，而且凤凰周刊对此事的阐述也并不详细，一带而过，所以这个私人恩怨的理由也不成立。那么究竟是谁要否定 H.H 第三世多杰羌佛及其地位？不是官方，不是私人恩怨，文章又直指宗教诈骗，而且用大量文字说明一个观点： H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的宗教身份是虚假的，根本没有任何佛教上的身份。所有的身份，包括现在的 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的名号，还有之前的 “仰谔益西诺布 大法王” 的密宗法王身份都是不真实的。根据凤凰周刊的报道，佛陀的名号，是自封的；法王的身份，是两个台湾人帮忙获得的。如果这两个理由成立，不管 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛是不是做了伤天害理的事情，都是不能为人接受。由两个台湾人帮忙就成了大法王，然后自封佛陀，真是佛教骗子无疑。那么谁又有资格和能力来确认其没有宗教身份这个问题呢？自然应当是权威性的佛教组织无疑！ 如果H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛利用伪造的佛教身份，欺骗众生，这是任何一个奉行如来正法的佛教寺院、宗教团体、和佛法上有证德证量的法王、仁波切、高僧大德都无法容忍的，揭露其欺骗行径是义不容辞的责任。绝对应该正义凛然地通告天下，也自然会注明其具有权威性的身份，比如什么寺庙、大和尚、法王、仁波切或者宗教团体。那么又是哪些佛教机构和著名佛教人士扮演了这样的正义角色呢？他们的身份又是怎样，他们反对或者否定的理由是什么？把这几个问题解决后，凤凰周刊身后是谁，代表谁做事，也许就有概念了。
通篇看下来，凤凰周刊引用的佛教机构一个，名称是“某西藏宗教基金会”，身份是藏传佛教流亡政府的代表，该基金会负责人叫达瓦才仁，他 “直接斥责义云高集团为诈骗集团”；凤凰周刊引用的法王一个，名称和身份是萨迦法王，流亡政府的常委，在接受台湾媒体采访时表示从来都没认证过 “第三世金刚持佛”；凤凰周刊引用的活佛一名，是藏区塔尔寺的 “唐让嘉瓦活佛”，他认为 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛外形不符合藏传佛教，衣服发型都不对，一看照片就有问题；凤凰周刊引用了网友一名，身份是佛教徒，叫吴飞龙，真名叫吴红海，网名是 “佛法常识”，是长期诽谤 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的人，据说有精神方面的疾病；还有一个脱离H.H第三世多杰羌佛体系的反水者，叫 “高先生”，身份是所谓被骗的商人，其实是涉嫌犯罪之人。
总共是来自五个方面的证据。不难看出，力证 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛是骗子的这一问题上，凤凰周刊的工作太偷懒了，总共加起来，连网友都算上只有五个，单薄了些。但是也没关系，要是 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛方面是自称的，那他一个证据也没有，5个还是不少的，遗憾的是认证、附议、祝贺 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛身份的文件竟然超过60个，这个对比数字对凤凰周刊不利。数量不能取胜，证据虽然单薄，但也许说话的机构和人是有分量的，也行啊。在这五个证据里，最有分量的是自称藏传佛教代表的某西藏宗教基金会，还有萨迦法王，两个虽少但是分量满重啊，藏传佛教的代表和法王，那是什么身份和地位！终于到了重要人物出场的时候了，这个藏传佛教的代表，负责人叫达瓦才仁（属于达赖流亡政府的要员）的 “某” 西藏基金会的真面容和全称是 - 达赖喇嘛西藏宗教基金会！！！这么个全世界著名的佛教机构，揭露一个佛教骗子，理所应当， 怎么凤凰周刊引用其声明，竟然不敢公开报其名号，而是用一个 “某” 字来代替呢？是什么原因让凤凰觉得 “达赖喇嘛” 这几个字会见光死呢？原因恐怕所有明眼人看到这里都会心知肚明。那么，达赖喇嘛和 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛是否有过节呢？简单搜索即可以发现，达赖集团对 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛从2010年或更早就开始攻击，有据可查。而H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛之所以是达赖喇嘛集团一贯针对的对象，是因为其佛陀降世的身份！道理很简单，佛陀降世了，还是金刚总持佛，法界总法王降临，你自封的什么藏传佛教的代表怎么会好使呢？这真是让人尴尬，一夜之间达赖喇嘛在国际上宣称的和 自居的藏传佛教的代表没有了存在的意义，这是什么概念？第一个问题清晰了，第二个萨迦法王的事情就简单了，2006 年写的认证，2008 年刊登在公开出版的书里，当第一版出版的第一时间，由出版社寄给了萨迦天津壹百本，同时也寄给了所有写过认证祝贺的活佛、法王们，大家都很高兴赞叹。一直到2012 年年末，迫于达赖的压力，萨迦法王本人才声明没有认证第三世金刚持佛。这里的是非曲直，我们会在稍后说明。到此，否认H.H 第三世多杰羌佛身份的仅有的5 个证据中最有分量的两个最终竟然指向同一个人 --- 达赖喇嘛。凤凰周刊这篇文章后面隐藏的主使终于浮现出来了。客观地说，即便凤凰周刊是达赖集团的枪手，也一样有权披露真相，阐述事实。即便是不想露出真身，如果所说的内容属实，那也还是一篇客观的报道。那么内容的真实性又怎么样呢，是否真的是有理有据，还是一派胡言？符合不符合达赖集团一贯的为了利益不择手段，敢于也勇于罔顾因果，颠倒黑白，混淆是非，泯灭道德，妄语犯戒的作风呢？笔者将一件一件分析，有缘读者自己明辨。来而不往非礼也，下面的标题就叫：堕落的周刊 - 凤凰周刊隐秘曝光，陷害圣洁大起底。
二、 堕落的周刊 --- 凤凰周刊隐秘曝光，陷害圣洁大起底
1. 凤凰周刊编假话说：这位“多杰羌佛”的真身，则是在中国被通缉长达十余年、外逃美国的诈骗犯
合理质疑：这一句话，是如此坚定判 定一个人的罪犯身份。诈骗罪，是一个明 确的罪名，应该由法院经过审判之后认定。 只有判决某人犯有诈骗罪，故称此人为诈骗犯。而在法院判决之前，对任何人都不能冠以罪犯的标签，这是人权的基本理念，是法律的定性名辞，凤凰周刊不会不知道吧。那么请问凤凰周刊，是哪一个国家的哪一个法院，对其人判定犯有诈骗罪？判决书何在？
事实情况：H.H 第三世多杰羌佛没有被任何一个国家的任何一个法院提起过刑事诉讼，乃至民事诉讼都没有过一次，更不用说判刑。国际刑警组织曾经接到某成员国向国际刑警组织发出通缉令要求逮捕 H.H 第三世多杰羌佛，几年后该成员国又主动请求撤除对 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的通缉令。国际刑警组织经过长期的调查，最后于2008年10月第七十二届 “国际刑警组织文件控制委员会” 大会上，撤除了该通缉令及整个案件，并发出正式通知文件，告知全世界国际刑警的成员国，不准留置 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛。同时， H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛也收到了通知文件，但H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛从不以此示人，对于诽谤者的猖狂造谣，也不放在心上。
2. 凤凰周刊标题之一：逃亡“活佛” 卷土重来
凤凰周刊：在这个标题下，文章介绍了听闻 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛法音的程序、 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛下辖的在海外注册的国际性组织、在香港举行的佛教大会、 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的弟子总数、网络上对 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的宣传情况，说 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的影响力非常巨大，在大陆、香港、台湾、美国都有非常多的信众。 “目前，这个身披袈裟的诈骗集团，秘密 ‘传法’ 活动已经横跨两岸三地，几乎遍布整个华人圈。”
合理质疑：世界各地寺庙、佛教团体、各个佛教宗派和著名的高僧大德座下的学佛之人不计其数，凤凰周刊没有提及；每年在世界各地、以各种形式举行的佛教法会数量众多，规模巨大，凤凰周刊忽略不计；各个佛教宗派、寺庙、佛教团体、高僧大德座下的信众对各自尊敬的师长在网络上赞叹、宣传，凤凰周刊也没有异议；凤凰周刊对全世界发生的事情都认可，唯独对跟随 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的信众数量、佛教僧尼总会召开的佛教大会、对赞叹和宣扬 H.H 第三世多杰羌佛的行为加以否定。为什 么要特意专门打击呢？这样做有没有合理的理由呢？答案是凤凰周刊认为 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛组织是一个 “身披袈裟的诈骗集团”，那么在去年香港大会上批判达赖，在台湾告达赖的流亡政府代表就都是不应该的事情了。凤凰周刊编造的逻辑是，因为 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛是诈骗犯，所以 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的一切行为以及他下面的组织和个人的行为都是诈骗行为。但 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛为什么是诈骗犯，却只是凤凰周刊的一面之词，没有任何证据证明凤凰周刊的这个观点成立。这在逻辑学上是不成立的，大前提虚假。在佛法的因明论上也是不成立的，宗因喻，三项，只有宗，也就是结论，没有因喻，也就是论证关系不成立，虚构立宗，判教无实，为谎言空架。
事实情况：H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的法音是完全公开听闻的，任何有缘众生都可听闻，没有秘密 “传法”；法音里阐述的是释迦世尊和三世诸佛的教义，包括第一世多杰羌佛的教义；法音里的内容法法圆融，契经契理，信众听闻收益非浅。全世界的各种资质的法师、活佛、高僧大德都在说法，世间也上充斥着各种各样的讲经说法的载体，录音、录像、书籍、CD，凤凰周刊都忽略了，偏偏认为 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛讲经说法有问题。写文章的人显然根本没有听过H.H 第三世多杰羌佛的法音，更没有上过第三世多杰羌佛办公室的网站看公告，也根本没有佛法基础和修为，却信心满满地否定了符合如来教法的法音，如果不是无知者无畏，就只能是故意诽谤！只要略有佛法基础之人，认真听听法音，上网看看公告，不用全部几千盘，只要一部分，自会明白，比起 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的讲法，世间上其他人的讲述，真是滴水与沧海之分，足下与云端之隔，不可同日而语，所谓的高僧大德已经不能望其项背，而 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛无私利众的道德言行，他们更是边际不沾。更不用说其至高的佛法证量，真实表显，法法具足。哪一个著名人物有信心敢于公开声明自己的证量高过 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛？至今没有发现一个这么做的。达赖集团既然指名点姓地说 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛是假的、是骗子，那么可以比试一下啊，展现一下比 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛高的证量不就行了，拿点实际成果摆在面前，就彻底证明了，敢诽谤，为什么不亲自证明自己更厉害呢，懦夫！送你们几句话，毫无侮辱任何人的意思，只是实话实说：不说是达赖这样一个凡夫充圣之人，就算把有同类邪恶观点的一千个乃至所有所谓的大活佛加在一起，也不敌 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的点滴成就，因为一万个凡夫加在一起还是凡夫，无法匹敌一个真正的圣者，何况是佛陀！不说 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的佛法证量和不收供养的利生行为，仅就 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛五明成就中的百分之一 --- 把石头中雕出雾气，达赖之流谁能做到？全加起来也雕不出一个石头中的雾来！如果认为这样太难了，为难你们，那来一个不难的，就把摆在表面的、一眼就能看得清清楚楚的彩色雕塑作品 “色韵玄黄”，照着做下来，总没有为难你们了吧， 如果照着做都做不了、做不像，五明之工巧明之百分之一都做不到，达赖这类人中，还有圣者吗？凡夫都是愚顽凡夫，难道不是吗？ H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的工巧明之一雕塑作品，就陈列在美国旧金山的公众艺术馆 - 美国国际艺术馆的 “宝贝室” 中，如果能照着同样做一个，或者你能找到一个你所谓的高手大师来把它复制下来，也算你达赖有真材实料的人，而且还有人发心并担保，如果你找来的人能够复制的话，你将会获得五千万美金的奖金，这样，你达赖、达瓦才仁和萨迦天津等说的话就有公信力，因为是圣者。如果连 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛工巧明中百分之一的部分雕塑都做不到，还大言不惭骗人，口口声声称五明具足，那你们掂量一下，你们算个什么？谁是骗子？有资格来对 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛指手画脚吗？你总不能找个借口说真圣者没有假圣者的本事大、真圣者没有假圣者的智慧高吧、或者五明在藏传佛教中只是说给人们听听而已？骗骗外行的鬼话吗？丢人去吧！
实际上，虽然第三世多杰羌佛五明圆满，显密圆通，但是 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛从来也没有像凤凰周刊指责的那样自称佛陀，相反总是自称惭愧行者，这在第三世多杰羌佛办公室的多份公告中已经明确体现， 也能够看到光明圣洁、无私利他的佛陀觉量；而佛陀办公室所发的纯净无私为利众生的公告，也是其他的法王、活佛的网站内容所难以企及的。 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛古佛再来的身份是全球佛教各大教派公开认证的。超过60位著名法王、摄政王、大仁波切们都先后认证、附议、祝贺 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的尊贵的地位，其中包括十七世噶玛巴的上师、嘉察摄政国师、夏玛巴摄政王、噶玛巴大宝法王的本尊法灌顶上师公保·都穆曲杰法王、达赖喇嘛的上师楚西法王、达龙哲珠 法王、秋吉崔钦法王、以及虹身法独掌人多珠钦 - 土登成利华桑波大法王、宁玛派第三任总教主贝诺法王、西藏当今第一大圣德阿秋法王、觉囊派总法王吉美多吉法王、夏珠秋扬仁波切、藏密佛史赫赫有名的、 观音法大成就者唐东迦波大菩萨和佐钦法王，等等几十份认证、附议和祝贺。而著名的佛门泰斗悟明长老、意昭老和尚等皆从羌佛座下受益。这样的巨圣降世，娑婆之幸，释迦世尊及十方诸佛都要礼敬赞叹娑婆世界众生有福！这些是什么周刊就能够抹杀得了吗？对几十位的认证视而不见，而把可怜的二三个否认声明拿来大做文章，真是可笑之极！一切否认 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛身份的人可分为两种，一种是故意否认，恶意诽谤，根本就是害怕H.H 第三世多杰羌佛降世的事实；一种是出于无知，自以为是，以自己有限浅薄的知见妄论真实的无限广博的佛法，以自己的凡夫之心去评判无上的佛陀证量，根本不知天高地厚，不过是叶公好龙式的佛教徒。这些人自己没有真实的佛法修为，根本没有见过真龙，因为真龙和他看到的画上的龙不一样而不认同，这是龙的问题，还是这个名义上喜欢龙和信仰龙的所谓信徒的问题呢？ H.H第三世多杰羌佛的信众人数众多，是因为 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛显密圆通，五明完满，实相表法，证德证量至高至圣，处处表显佛法真实不虚，其成就显赫，在世界上堪称顶首独冠，无人超越，信众自然跟随，请问有何问题？ H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛领导下的国际佛教僧尼总会在香港召开的佛教大会在政府和中国宗教协会都有报备，是合乎佛法教义、合乎国家法律而举行的普利大众、利国利民的法会，错在哪里？ H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛座下的弟子奉行如来教法， 四无量心，六度万行，慈悲帮助利益大众，上供诸佛，下化一切困苦众生，何罪之有？ H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的弟子乃至当年释迦牟尼佛的弟子，也有一些违背经教、不听话的人，难道这些也要打给H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛和释迦牟尼佛陀吗？
3. 究竟是不是骗钱的“法王”？
凤凰周刊：在此部分，凤凰周刊列举了政府为H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛修的大师馆，成就的展出和获赠的礼物；说当时各界名流纷纷到访；H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛原来就是一个宝光寺的临时画工，后因行为不检被撵走，佛教上的法王身份是两个台湾人帮助得到的，这两个台湾人又反过来被 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛认证为 “法王”、“活佛”；文章说2001年因为诈骗刘百行和刘娟东窗事发，深圳警方介入调查之后，遭到通缉， H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛远遁海外。
合理质疑：大师馆是谁修建的？ 那些成就是不是真实存在的？ 如果凤凰周刊认定其人是骗子，那么他用了哪些不好的手段，骗得各界名流到访呢？ 这两个台湾人是怎么帮助他获得了大师和法王的身份的？ 如果诈骗是真实的，为什么刘百行、刘娟事后声明没有被诈骗呢？ 通缉令是什么时候发的，又是什么时候 “远遁” 美国的？ 凤凰周刊对上述这些相关的具体问题都没有答案，是没有调查吗，还是调查结果不理想随便编一套迷哄大众呢？ 不承认就拿出理由服众宣吧！
【刘百行先生在记者会上发言指出，他的师父 第三世多杰羌佛从来没有骗过他，骗他的是黄晓穗，他一直非常尊敬他的师父 第三世多杰羌佛。
事实情况：
(1) 凤凰周刊里指明的大师馆，确实存在，是当时的大邑县政府官方出资打报告给成都市计委立项批准修建的，政府还在馆门口立了石头碑记，并出书发行。该馆于政府全民所有制性质，是为表彰H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛当时所取得的殊胜成就，里面有H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛当时的多方面的成就以及获赠的各种礼物，来自各个方面国内国外。如果是诈骗犯，怎么会有如此高规格的政府待遇和国内国际声誉？ 事实恰恰相反。在开馆那一天，H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛写信给政府，说：这大师馆是政府和人民的，他无资格享受，请原谅，他不能出席。这是何等无私圣洁？ 正如释迦世尊当初成佛前示现世间法无论文武天下第一，H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛在真正法义上的身份认证之前同样示现世间法上五明的完满，无有出其右者。唯有在世间上的智慧已经至真完美才能从法义上达到佛陀再世或大圣降临，否则世间法上五明都不完满、都没有登峰造极，如何证明真的是无与伦 比绝胜超宗？所有 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛在被认证为佛陀之前的一切荣誉和声望都是来自官方和非官方自愿发心。凤凰周刊说这一切是两个台湾商人操控的，那么当时相关的中国政府何以无能 到被两个台湾商人所左右？ 当时中国佛教机构给予的声誉、中国有名的政府官员和各界名流以及求法学佛的高僧大德何以如此不堪，甘心被两个台湾人所愚弄？ 凤凰周刊一厢情愿地否定了所有涉及到的政府、官员、各界名流、高僧大德当时的智慧！ 请问凤凰周刊，发东方艺术大师勋章，是政府什么高等机构主持颁发的，你知道吗？
【刘娟在报纸上发表经公证的声明，说明 第三世多杰羌佛从来没有骗过她，而是无私地帮助她和她的家人。】
(2) 实证查核到的是， H.H. 第三世羌 佛在其身份被认证前后取得了诸多世界级的荣誉和成就。1991 年第三世多杰羌佛被授予“东方艺术大师”称号；1994 年，在48个国家和地区组成的世界诗人文化大会，被5612名专家学者代表，选定为 “特级国际大师”，国家元首级荣位。还获得英国皇家艺术学院两百多年来唯一的 “Fellow”，并获得博士证书。在美国著名大学任职教授9年，获得大学特别褒奖。乃至于2010年在美国国会被授予 “世界和平奖” 和马丁路德金世界领袖和国际服务奖、总统金牌奖等， 1月19日被美国首都华盛顿政府行文宣布为 “第三世多杰羌佛日”，成为全世界第一个佛陀日，同时华府邮政总局发行了纪念首日风其成就总和之多，所涉范围之广，人间尚未发现第二人堪舆匹敌。佛陀三十大类的成就，一本厚厚的《多杰羌佛第三世》的书里都写不下，笔者凡夫一枚怎么能说得清楚？ 为了让未读过此书的读者能稍做了解，勉为其难总结如下：诗词歌赋，唐韵宋骨；文论著述，学养深厚；千金难买，绘画金石；美轮美奂，佛像建筑；工巧之高，韵雕藏雾；医方之明，不可胜数：岐黄神针，无病不愈，无情有损，转瞬修复！如来正法，开示无误，佛音清远，深入浅出；因明内明，至高圣处，五部灌顶，佛降甘露；解脱手印，娑婆顶圣；座下弟子，高人无数；神通证量，世间无右；古佛再来，众生依怙；前无古德，沧桑无双！ 实际上就算言辞穷尽，也无法尽数说清佛陀的成就！这些是铁一般的事实，身为佛弟子，谁能不为有这样一位巨圣住世而庆幸自己有福报，大事因缘，巨圣降世，千载得逢，幸甚之至！凤凰周刊和诽谤者把如此了得有本事而大公无私的巨圣说得低俗不堪，非要说成是骗子，这是怎么一回事？
(3) H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛被认证为古佛再来之前的身份是 “仰谔益西诺布法王”，而且是密宗总持大法王，这是众所周知的，只要稍微加以了解和调查即可确定。凤凰周刊说是两个台湾人帮助获得了法王的身份，这真是令人贻笑大方，法王是说帮忙获得就能得到的吗？ 其法王的认证和证量都 有事实可查，凤凰周刊说是假的，证据呢？ 或者没有证据至少要说明，法王身份取得是何时，认识这两个台湾人是在何时？ 台湾人他们怎么帮忙的，谁给了法王的身份呢？ 凤凰周刊把严肃庄严的法王身份说的如此轻薄和不堪，除了根本的无知之外实际上侮辱了全世界的法王。而且，文章里指的 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛认证了吴文投和恒生仁波切的法王、活佛身份，根本是无稽之谈， 他们都有各自的合法的认证，唯独不是H.H 第三世多杰羌佛认证的，这个有证可查，非常容易就可以判定真假。
(4) 刘娟诈骗案的事实是根本没有诈骗，这一切都是故意陷害。这个所谓诈骗案件中受害人刘娟曾亲自写给深圳市中级人民法院一份陈述，说明诈骗不是事实， H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛根本没有诈骗她，一切都是人为故意的陷害。刘娟写陈述和公证时都录了相存证的，在录相中，刘娟严肃表明是她自愿写的，没有受威胁等外界影响，这份陈述刘娟亲自拿给美国官员公证签字，中国领事馆驻美国洛杉矶领事签字，是确凿有效的法律证据，凤凰周刊为什么不报导？既然没有诈骗的事实，那么所谓的负罪潜逃从何而来呢？ 诈骗刘百行一事同理，如果诈骗属实，为什么凤凰周刊报导的受害人亲自到记者招待会，说 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛从来没有骗过他？ 凤凰周刊根本不能自圆其说。事实是1999年7月底羌佛应国际知名的美国盖提博物馆的邀请，持合法证件从中国海关出关到美国，有记录可调查。2003年4月才是凤凰周刊报导的所谓诈骗案东窗事发被通缉之时，已过了三年多时间，说负罪潜逃根本是混淆视听。把一个身处海外，被人陷害的事情，说成犯罪被通缉潜逃，这样偷梁换柱，究竟是为了报导事实，还是为了故意误导大众从而打击报复？ H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛相关的被陷害的事实真相，早有披露说明，相关陷害者也已被香港法院于2004年以串谋欺诈罪判处11年徒刑，他们陷害 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的动机是由于其挪用公款的骗局被 H.H. 第 三世多杰羌佛发现，利益受损而对 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛进行打击报复。国际刑警也曾于2005年9月应会员国申请对 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛立案侦查，经过3年的调查，于2008年10 月由国际刑警组织大会决议撤销立案和通缉令。为什么凤凰周刊不予调查研究，反而以讹传讹？
(5) 凤凰周刊说广东警方发布通缉还保留，能证明什么，只能证明确实有人曾经陷害过 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛！ 而且，可以想象，既然国家都已经调查无罪，请求了国际刑警撤销了通缉令，为什么广东深圳警方还要跟中央政府相对抗，来丢中央政府的脸？ 是显示中国中央政府表面向国际刑警说一套，背地里又另做一套吗？ 这到底是对中央不屑一顾呢？ 还是显示天高皇帝远呢？ 还是执行的是另外一国的法律，比如达赖流亡政府的法规呢？ 难道世间的行政机关一切行为都正确合法吗？ 倘如此，就不需要监督了，也没有国家赔偿法存在的意义。其实不烦想象是那些抢夺了 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛几百张书画的人，为了保住自己的非法所得而故意继续造谣以得一件外衣，遮盖自己的贪腐行迹。借用一个 “非法所得” 就抢走了 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的几百张自己创作的书画，这些是佛陀从小辛苦奋斗、自己创作的书画艺术，却被一些人抢夺霸占贪腐了，这是依什么强盗逻辑和法律定出来的 “非法所得”？ 一当中央知道了，某些人才会知道什么是非法所得。当初曾经陷害迫害的机构和个人，当反思将来，佛陀老人家慈悲不会追究，但因果不昧，就没有人追究吗？ 拨乱反正是迟早的事情。凤凰周刊是非不分，并不真正调查，即使违背法律道德、罔顾事实也要帮某些人给 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛身上泼上污水，真是欲加之罪，何患无辞！ 这与过去坏人迫害释迦牟尼佛同出一辙的手段！ 这是一个有独立精神的负责的媒体应该有的行为么？ 是中国、香港和美国的法律法规所允许的行为吗？
(6) 关于工作，当时在宝光寺做的工作是四川省政府下文调入宝光寺工作，同时期也有其他省政府下文调入的工作人员，而离开宝光寺也是因为政府安排所有在寺工作人员一起离开，重新安排工作，当时把 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛调到文化馆。况且，画工的工作为什么让凤凰周刊如此歧视呢？ 如果画艺已经达到至高，你管他叫画工，还是大师，是你的问题，有损至高的境界吗？ 还有，凤凰周刊为了把脏水泼在 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的身上而不择手段，说 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛是小学生水平。一个小学生能写出那些诗词歌赋吗？ 能写出那些论文、哲言、古典文章吗？ 殊不知， H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛从小就是读古文、兼学现代文出身，青年时代就写成古文诗集，为当时的四川省委宣传部副部长陈文亲题书名、省委当时的杨超书记题写 “艺坛奇才”、国防部长张爱萍等均称为奇才而题赞。中国著名大诗人、书法家、中国书法报社社长、湖北省文史馆馆长吴丈蜀先生与青年羌佛一席对话，谈古论今，当看到羌佛所写的古文小说《访杨迹》、《余如是鉴》、《识 己立人》、《艺程》等文论时，敬佩之至，大叹奇绝：“惊世之才来了。” 当即写下 “前身应是王摩诘，脱尽凡胎见慧根。” 此时的羌佛早已成为一代文豪，要不然，又怎么会拿到博士证书呢？怎么可能会在美国的州立大学任教授一职九年、受到校长院长的高度赞叹获得奖状呢？ 当然，凤凰周刊肯定没有看到他每个月的工资单！ 你凤凰周刊也去包装个大师，让国际奥委会主席签发大师证来看看吧！ 今天把你量定了，你找遍全世界也找不到这样一个真材实料来得到国际奥委会主席签发大师证，你们还竟然把一个堂堂大学教授、Fellow侮辱成学历水平不高，仅凭《访杨迹》、《余如是鉴》、《艺程》这三篇文章，你凤凰周刋的总编能拿得出这样通今达古、才华横溢、学贯通场的手笔吗? 就算把总编先生升级成文学博士后，在文学的造诣上又怎么能望其 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的项背呢? 至于 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛其他方面的惊世成就，我们就不要求你做到了，因为你们差得实在太远。
羌佛画艺之高绝，笔者不能在文章里再现，只听其每每不可思议之一幅上千万美元售价，也能明白一二。在此摘录笔者喜欢的几篇诗词以飨读者。古人讲诗以言志，文如其人，那么写出这样立意高远、气荡寰宇、内含雅秀，又蕴含佛法真谛作品的人，会如凤凰周刊所描述的那样是小学生水平吗？ 羌佛16岁时作词《念奴娇》：“顿入乾坤，大千界，万磊坎坷雄立。百种风流纵辉煌，终归一笑了结。金红报晓，晨钟催月，一展娑婆迹。群生奔涯，恍然如烟化雪！曾忆云高昔岁，文武空门好，狮子震裂。三千患疾访俺门，昼夜岐黄施绝。百万思头，悠悠般若道，三界荡击。愿平生事，尽为有情销益。” 羌佛21岁那年游登黄山，见景感慨杜甫 “望岳” 果然是绝世奇吟，随借杜甫律韵吟：观山止（五律）岱宗夫然乎，五岳未接骚。山月问霞辉，齐鲁清目了。荡气醉回肠，云鹏量鸦鸟。高登达玉皇，阅尽诸山小。吟唱至此，灵犀一点，虽绝妙有佳，但何以借杜甫韵律章句而出情怀，必有交待方可，随即再吟七绝《借君韵》：“愧取工部韵律同，点染人间烟火踪。绝顶风骚曾几度，莞尔一笑两情浓。” 笔者读罢，不禁拍手惊奇，好一个 “绝顶风骚曾几度， 莞尔一笑两情浓”！ 此诗文句高雅，才华横溢，旷古绝章，随吟道破取杜甫律韵之因，与一代诗圣惺惺相惜之情跃然纸上！ 其诗词歌赋、文论、经史之学的成就纵览当代文坛，何人相当？岂是大学博士能出其右？ 正如诗里所写：高登达玉皇，阅尽诸山小。
【四川新都莊增述的親筆函】
4. “佛陀” 身份是不是骗来的？
凤凰周刊：凤凰周刊列举了两个人否认 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛佛陀身份的说法。唐让嘉瓦活佛说一看就知道他不对，因为他的外形不符合藏传佛教，第一眼见到照片，便感觉有问题。萨迦法王否认认证过第三世金刚持佛（金刚持佛即是多杰羌佛），认证书是萨迦法王的弟子楚称曲培伪造的。 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛是自称的。
合理质疑：2008 年《多杰羌佛第三世》面世，里面引用了几十位著名法王、仁波切的认证、附议、祝贺，凤凰周刊有没有去具体了解这些认证的真假呢？ 要联系这些人并不困难，为什么只扔下一句 “真实性令人怀疑？” 就没有了下文？ 既然令人怀疑，作为报道的记者为什么没有去查证呢？ 只提供了两个否定的意见。再问持否定意见的唐让嘉瓦仁波切，对于是不是真正的H.H 第三世多杰羌佛，不是要用佛法上的证量来判断吗？ 至少要入定观照这个人吧？是用看照片来决定的吗？ 是靠外形和衣服、发型符合不符合藏传佛教来决定的吗？ 不是靠真实的佛陀证量和真实本事来衡量吗？ 究竟是H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛没有真本事，还是否定 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的人连个认证的本事都没有呢？ 大家见到过哪一尊佛陀像没有头发呢？ 释迦牟尼佛满头青丝卷发，多杰羌佛不但是长发，而且是八宝庄严其身，观音菩萨、文殊菩萨、普贤菩萨、莲花生大师都是长发过肩。这个唐让嘉瓦连这点基本的佛法知识都不懂，这不是一个混进佛教的假活佛，难道是不通经教真活佛吗？ 再则，如果按照这个唐让嘉瓦自己所说的没有写过文证，那他手上提着照相的文字又是什么？ 这样公开打妄语，还是一个修行人吗？ 难怪社会上传言，西藏很多骗子、假活佛，不得不令人相信。更可笑的是，唐让嘉瓦的顶头法王、塔尔寺宗康法王和比唐让嘉瓦地位高的孟嘉活佛都写附议恭贺赞叹 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛，你一个法王座下的无名小卒，怎么不把自己称一称，就妄想翻天为你的主子达赖摇旗呐喊效劳吗？ 至于萨迦天津法王否认认证 H.H. 第三 世多杰羌佛，其弟子楚称曲培堪布公开忏悔，说自己伪造了萨迦天津给 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的认证书一事，也不是一面之词就能决定的。请问凤凰周刊，有没有亲自面见萨迦天津法王并采访？ 有没有面见楚称曲培并了解他是怎么伪造的，为什么伪造， 为什么他先是祝贺后又反悔，凤凰周刊有没有了解另一方面的情况，有哪些证人证明认证书是真实的，是萨迦天津法王亲笔写的，这些作证的人都是谁，究竟发生了什么？
事实情况：是2006年12月10日萨迦法王写了认证书交给了白玛多杰仁波切，2006年12月21日楚称曲培还为此写了认证书祝贺，了解整个过程的还有其他的相关人员，都证明认证书的真实性。但是在2008年《多杰羌佛第三世》面世后，楚称曲培忏悔自己伪造认证书，随后国际佛教僧尼总会即做了说明，说明认证书是真实的并指出楚称曲培承认自己造假的真正原因，并要求萨迦天津法王本人公开声明没有认证，但萨迦天津法王没有回应，默认了认证这件事情。直到2012年5月国际佛教僧尼总会等机构在台湾将达赖喇嘛西藏流亡政府告上法庭，因其恶意诽谤H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛团体； 2012年下半年，萨迦天津法王身为达赖流亡政府的一个常委，迫于达赖的压力，带信给H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的学生、噶当派的大活佛，说了他受到压力的原因，并说不要把他写的认证再登报宣传了，他自己也不再提这件事了，让它慢慢冷下来。
【塔尔寺的唐让嘉瓦，主动写了贺函并拿在手里照了相， 如果按照这个唐让嘉瓦自己所说的没有写过文证，那他手上提着照相的文字又是什么？ 这样公开打妄语，还是一个修行人吗？】
【近代藏密第一大圣者阿秋法王在写给 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的认证书上盖了两个手印实况留影】
【阿秋法王写的认证书】
【十七世噶玛巴的本尊传法上师公保法王手持给 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛写的确认书录像照片作证】
【公保法王写的确认书】
萨迦天津虽然如此说，但却在台湾暗地里发声否认写过认证，随后国际佛教僧尼总会公布相关当事人的证言证明萨迦天津否认不成立。2012年，由达赖的上师宁玛大法王顶果钦哲认证的白玛多杰仁波切再次公开证明2006年12月10日，萨迦天津法王在尼泊尔的达拉为 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛写了认证书，亲自交到自己的手中，这份认证书交到国际佛教僧尼总会了，就是印在《多杰羌佛第三世》书上的认证书，白玛多杰仁波切写证明时公开录了像的。那么很显然，这两个人中肯定有一个说了假话，不是萨迦天津，就是白玛多杰。在佛教教义上，佛教徒在三宝面前发下誓言是最严肃的事情，因为关系佛教徒解脱成就还是妄语堕落，所以非同小可。但可以掌握的事实是白玛多杰敢于对其所述事实 发誓是真实不虚，而萨迦天津则拒绝发誓。国际佛教僧尼总会为认证书的真实与否曾通过法院寄存证信函要求萨迦天津一起在寺庙大殿发誓，但他暗地里跑掉了，国际佛教僧尼总会单方面在寺庙大殿里发了誓， 并由电视台播出了实况。不管怎么说，至此这件事情的事实恐怕明眼人早就看清楚了，根本不是 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛伪造了认证，而是萨迦天津和达赖一方演了一出闹剧。
【萨迦天津法王为 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛写好认证后，交给由顶果钦哲大法王认证和主持坐床的宁玛派大活佛俊麦白玛多杰仁波且。这是俊麦白玛多杰仁波且在证明这件事。这是录像时的照片】
H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛身份成立与否，不是靠这两个法王和活佛的说法来决定的。正如本文前面列举了几十位的认证、附议、祝贺，凤凰周刊都置之不理。那么多法王仁波切的亲笔认证函，凤凰周刊也能一叶障目，把所有这些忽视不见，真是让人无语。但事实是不容置疑的， H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的身份不是因为认证才取得的，而是因为真实的证量才获得了如此多的认证。其实，这些认证根本就没有实质作用，更何况，写了文证却不承认，根本也不是一个有道德的人，这种人写的文证，无疑是对 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的玷辱污染。正如 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛说：“我是什么，不是凭活佛说了算，更不是凭法王、活佛写认证、附议定的，而是凭自己的言行本质，所以现在我照常是无始以来的惭愧者，没有增，没有减，诽谤对我没有污，赞誉对我没有光，我无非是大众面前的一个惭愧服务员而已。大圆满最高龙钦宁体独掌人第四世多珠钦大法王土登成利华桑波说得好：“黄金放在污泥中照常是黄金， 黄铜怎么磨光也是黄铜，认证有什么用？” 我们回想一下，释迦牟尼佛来这个世界，有谁为他认证呢？ 而是靠他的证量和教法圆满了佛陀的觉量。H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的成就和觉量是铁一般的事实，需要这些人来承认、认同吗？ 凤凰周刊能做的只是对毫不知情的大众做口头的误导，达到玷污 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛名誉的目的罢了。 可佛陀的证量会因为误导就不存在了吗？ 任何人想要了解随时随地可以知道真相，这是想陷害的人毫无办法的事情，他们只能寄希望于普通大众读完他们提供的虚假报道后，从此认定这个H.H 第三世多杰羌佛是骗子而永远不去查证，这只能是诽谤者一厢情愿的愚痴。
5. 人民日报海外版事件及世界和平奖
凤凰周刊：人民日报海外版2011年7月28日第八版这个版面刊登了《真正合法认证的第三世多杰羌佛》一文，替 H.H 第三世多杰羌佛吹捧和做宣传，人民日报9月28日声明是有人擅自置换。 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛获得世界和平奖，颁奖机构是国际骗子集团。
合理质疑：请问凤凰周刊，人民日报第八版被人置换，是什么人置换的？ 为什么置换？ 所谓被人置换的文章里报道的 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的身份是不是成立的呢？ 世界和平奖委员会为什么是国际骗子集团，是怎么确认的？ 被哪一个国家的法律认定、哪一个法院判决定性的是国际骗子集团？
事实情况：
(1) 人民日报海外版的确在2011年7月28日刊登了『 合法认证 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛 』的文章，如此大报，两个月后发表了一个说明，说是有人擅自置换内容，这样一份说明被诽谤H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的人如获至宝，包括凤凰周刊。人民日报如此大报，内容登错了，要等两个月后才发声明？ 这里面到底发生了什么事情？ 国际佛教僧尼总会澄清与此事无关，没有为 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛做广告宣传， H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛也不需要做宣传。人民日报没有否认 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的身份，也否认不了，代表人民日报海外版的律师在答覆佛音广播联盟之法律取证时，说他们有权刊登文章，他们没有否认已刊登 “真正合法认证的第三世多杰羌佛”，其他的人诽谤行为与他们无关。这还不清楚吗？ 这是置换人民日报呢？ 还是人民日报海外版刊登的呢？ 有些人可以想办法不认人民日报曾经刊发过这篇文章， 却无法否认 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的佛陀再来的事实，也无法否认在全世界公开的 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的一切证德证量！
(2) 根据公开信息，2010年度世界和平奖，是由世界和平奖评选委员会在美国国会众议院举行的颁奖仪式，2010年度获得世界和平奖的获得者是 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛、前众议院外交委员会主席本杰明 - 吉尔曼，同时和平巡回大使奖授予美国民用航空巡逻搜救组织。自1989年成立以来，“世界和平奖”的获奖人，皆曾致力调解政治纠纷、国际及经济事宜，为人类社会带来安全稳定。曾获奖者包括美国总统美国第四十任总统里根、印度圣雄甘地、菲律宾第十二任总统拉莫斯、印度尼西亚第四任总统瓦希德、埃及前总统穆巴拉克、帕劳前总统中村国雄、蒙古首任总统彭萨勒玛•奥其尔巴特、南韩首任总统李承晚、以色列前总理拉宾、尼日利亚前总统雅库布•勾文、埃塞俄比亚总理梅莱斯•泽纳维，以及柬埔寨总理等。根据凤凰周刊的说法，这是一个国际骗子集团。但问题是这个骗子集团光明正大地在美国的国会颁奖给美国前众议院外交委员会主席和美国民用航空巡逻搜救组织。凤凰周刊如此一口咬定这个组织是骗子集团，是想说颁奖的机构是国际骗子集团所 以颁的奖是假的，而颁奖的对象也是骗子吗？那么凤凰周刊是不是想说明历史上曾经同样获得过该奖项的例如美国第四十任总统里根、印度圣雄甘地等也都是骗子呢？ 这个逻辑还请凤凰周刊要自己搞搞清楚。请问凤凰周刊有没有调查和征询过美国政府的意见，有没有问过颁奖所在地美国国会的意见，以及其他获奖者的意见？ 最主要的有没有问问美国法律的意见呢，还是，美国法律认为合法，美国国会认为合法，美国民众认为合法，美国获奖者认为合法，而只有远在香港的凤凰周刊认为这个组织是国际骗子集团，它就是国际骗子集团，被颁奖的人都是国际骗子呢，究竟谁说了算呢？ 凤凰周刊做好了公然诽谤一个国际知名机构的准备了吗？ 再一点，美国第112届国会参议院于2012年12月12日无记名投票全票通过第614 号决议，表彰世界和平奖和里根总统、 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛及外交委员会主席，如果按照凤凰周刊的观点，那美国国会参议员个个都是骗子了？ 美国国会也是一个骗子机构了？
【 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛获颁2010 年世界和平奖最高荣誉奖，图为在美国国会金厅的颁奖现场。】
(3) 凤凰周刊还指责国际佛教僧尼总会，联合国际世界佛教总部、世界法音出版社、 全球佛教出版社，缺乏公信力和认可度， 请问凤凰周刊是怎么得出这个结论的？ 上述组织和机构都拥有合法身份，而且所作所为都有据可查，哪一件哪一桩违背了法律和道德，哪一件是对人类的和谐发展和世界和平有损的事情，怎么缺乏公信力和认可度？ 谁不认可，为什么不认可？ 这些应当说明的问题凤凰周刊轻轻省略了，没有理由，只有结论。其实笔者想问的是他们是合法成立的机构，需要谁认可，谁想要管理他们，谁希望在他们之上拥有认可权？ 他们都是佛教团体，谁想要管理他们，而对他们接受 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的指导不满呢？ 达赖喇嘛自称藏传佛教的代表，借用达瓦才仁的逻辑，既然别人需要认可，倒要问一句，谁认可你达赖喇嘛的藏传佛教的代表的身份呢？ 怎么代表呢？ 是从世间法上代表呢，还是从法义真谛上代表呢？ 正如佛教僧尼总会指出的：“格鲁派在前藏的法王是达赖喇嘛，在后藏的法王是班禅，在蒙古的领袖是章嘉呼图克图，格鲁派的总 领袖是宗喀巴大师，但宗大师也不是整个藏传佛教的领袖，达赖喇嘛就更没有资格，达赖喇嘛只是格鲁派在前藏的领袖。达赖喇嘛流亡政府的宗教与文化部是只能代表达赖喇嘛个人的政治机构，根本不具备认同谁的资格，谁承认达赖喇嘛是藏传佛教领袖？ 他不是西藏佛教各大教派的祖师领袖。谁承认流亡政府？ 这个没有国土、没有公民的政治机构，却要做整个藏传佛教的代表又谁承认呢？” 而且，这一世的达赖只有格鲁派摄政王第五世热振写的一份认证书，其它的派都不承认，没有给他写认证，如果获得了各大教派领袖超过六十份认证的 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的身份凤凰周刊都认为是假的、都不成立的话，那仅仅拿到一份格鲁派摄政认证的达赖的身份就更不能成立了，那他有什么资格来否定他人呢。
【觉囊派总法王吉美多吉在写给 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的附议贺函上盖章】
(4) 再看看达赖在做什么，达赖喇嘛是日本邪教头目麻原札幌的师父，后者是奥姆真理教的教主，麻原给达赖捐款，达赖就 给麻原写证书，证明奥姆教传播大乘佛教，麻原依此在日本政府取得认可。而从达赖学习后，麻原的理念颠倒，认为违反社会常识和法律的犯罪行为不再是禁忌。1994年6月，1995年3月，奥姆真理教分别在松本市和东京地铁施放毒气，造成大量人员伤亡，尤其是后者，造成5000多人受伤。达赖与纳粹分子关系密切。达赖与纳粹分子布鲁诺·贝尔格、奥地利的海因里希·哈勒、智利的米格尔·谢拉诺等保持着密切的关系，这些都是公开的事实，1994年在伦敦明确承认达赖独立的7个西方代表均是各国的纳粹分子。2009年7月5日乌鲁木齐暴力事件，至少197 人死亡，1721人受伤。煽动和策划这次暴力事件的就是世维会主席热比娅。2007年7月达赖和热比娅在德国汉堡见面，亲密留影；2008年3月，在华盛顿，热比娅表示支持藏独，达赖则投桃报李为热比娅的自传写序。达赖集团为了达到藏独的目的，不惜鼓吹藏人自焚来对政府施加压力。2012年西藏发生多起自焚事件，达赖竟然对美国记者说：我非常肯定的是，这些自焚者之所以牺牲自己是因为怀着真诚的动机，是为了佛法和人民的福祉，从佛教的观点看，是积极的。达赖喇嘛西藏宗教基金会董事长达瓦才仁表示，在佛教教义中，如果为自己自焚不被允许，如果为了利他而自焚，则是受尊崇的高贵情操。佛陀也舍身饲虎。这哪里是如来正法，分明是披着佛衣戕害众生的恶魔！ 从娑婆有佛史以来，哪一 个佛菩萨不是慈悲救度众生，为度生而宁愿牺牲自己，哪里会为了自己牺牲众生？！ 舍身饲虎，是佛陀舍自己的身喂养众生，没有让舍别人的身！ 差别就在这里。佛菩萨为救众生牺牲的是自己，达赖集团为了自己的利益牺牲的是众生！ 达赖和达瓦才仁如果你们认为自焚在佛教上是积极的，是值得赞叹的，是佛陀的行为，你们为什么不去自焚献给佛法事业，献给众生？ 利用众生对你身份的信任和虔诚，你们却毫无思报之心行，达赖竟然还说做得不够，让众生为你们自己的私利无辜送命，这是什么样残忍的行为？ 断了多少众生慧命，还打着佛陀的旗号！ 不是世尊灭度前预言的魔又是什么？
【吉美多吉法王写的附议贺函】
(5) 中国政府坚持指出达赖欺骗国际社会，但是一直以来达赖装扮的被迫害的宗教领袖形象不仅蒙蔽着包含西藏在内的中国人民，也蒙蔽着美国、英国、法国、德国、日本等所有国家的人民，但是纸包不住火，假的总会露馅的。2011 年，法国学者法国作家马克西姆·维瓦斯在对中国西藏进行长达1年的调查采访后，撰写了《并非如此 “禅”：达赖隐匿的另一面》一书。该书将向西方读者展示达赖口中的西藏与真实西藏间的巨大差异，从多角度、多层次对达赖进行解读，指出达赖根本不是他表现出来的微笑、宽容的样子，反而披着宗教外衣，内心充满了凶悍和虚伪，表面和平实质支持战争，宣扬教派平等实际却打压教派。维瓦斯指出，达赖一伙的所作所为符合法国有关邪教的几乎所有定义；维瓦斯最后说：达赖喇嘛、他的吹捧者与赞助者才是恶魔。早在2002年德国的特里蒙迪夫妇就发文指出，达赖所谓的 “和平” 形象都是假的，实际上是“伪君子”。在美国也有相关人士对达赖进行指责，而所有这些都来自原来高度认同达赖的西方国家而不是中国政府， 世界越来越发现达赖的真面目，是一个披着宗教外衣，打着佛教旗号残害人类众生的恶魔。2013 年10月22日，全国政协民族和宗教委员会主任朱维群在意大利罗马接受记者专访时，指出达赖是一个利用宗教对人的精神进行操控和欺骗的 “领袖”。今天的世界上你还可以另外举出宗教领袖号召信徒自焚来实现自己的目标，来达到宗教修行的例子吗？ 记者脱口而出：基地组织！ 达赖集团和基地组织一样根本是恐怖组织，还伪装成佛教领袖！
(6) 当今娑婆世界真正的佛教领袖是 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛。羌佛在世界和平奖颁奖典礼上说：“我认为得到这个奖不是对我个人的肯定，而是对整个人类追求和平、幸福、自由、平等的肯定，是对所有无私利益他人、帮助他人的肯定，所以，我会永恒不变地践行我的愿力：众生的一切造业罪 过由我承担，我种的一切善业功德全给你们。”羌佛如是说，也如是行，在佛陀的法音里处处是如何利益众生，如何离苦得乐，如何解脱成就，如何世界和平，他老人家燃烧自己救度众生，自觉觉他，大悲无量，为度末法时期众生，发愿不收供养只利益众生！这样的如来正行，这样的佛陀德相，哪里还有第二个人堪舆匹敌？ H.H 第三世多杰羌佛的无上佛法开示和不可思议的佛法证量，清楚摆在那里，《解脱大手印》，《藉心经说真谛》等，法王名副其实；五明完整无缺，详见《多 杰羌佛第三世》一书三十大类，历史第一人；工巧神奇韵雕，石中藏雾，真实物件，公开陈列在美国国际艺术馆中，谁是骗子？ 货真价实的人是骗子，还是百无一能的人是骗子呢？ 达赖一边号称藏传佛法最高领袖，一边没有任何真实本事，不是用佛经上的菩萨在五明中得、不是用佛法上的证德证量来赢得敬仰，而是用世间江湖骗子骗人的手段，到哪里都对各国献媚，用谎言遮盖自己的丑恶，用牺牲别人的生命来维护自己的利益，哪有一个佛法至高的法王的样子，就连一个有证量的圣德的庄严和德相也没有。用卑鄙手段蒙蔽良知，结果丑恶的心行暴露，被越来越多的国家拒绝，让自己成为笑话而已，这正是佛法上的因果不昧。 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛用自己的证德证量，慈悲宽容，换来世间的热爱和敬仰，即便被人误解和迫害，无论任何场合从未说过一句抱怨，更无丝毫嗔恨，甚至对迫害的人都是以德报怨，告诫弟子要慈悲为怀，但只管修行利众，莫管是非。包括问到他对凤凰周刊玷污圣洁的看法，羌佛说：“一切众生皆在无明烦恼中生存，难免没有错误，其实都是我不好，至少没有让他们在我的身上生法喜，他们的不是由我承担，请原谅他们吧。” 这样的德行，岂是达赖及其追随者还有凤凰周刊之流能望其项背乎？想浑水摸鱼，可惜连搅浑水的本事都不具备啊，道德行为如此低劣，好可怜！
(7) 问问凤凰周刊和达赖之流，如果一个人，你懂的他全会，而且你不懂的他也懂，甚至你闻所未闻的他都知道，那么有你听不懂的事情，或者和你的认识不符，请问是你的问题，还是教授者的问题？你是要明白求教，还是只管摇头否认：你说的我没听过所以你说的是假话。确认真假，你至少要比你指责的人有本事吧，或者你自己经历过他说的事情，才有权评论真假吧？ 论道德忍辱，你不好使；论讲经说法，你不是对手；论佛法实际证量，你差十万八千里；论世间法上的五明圆满，你根本没有；论慈悲救度，人家弟子都是修证功深，随便度人轻轻松松送到极乐世界，死能复生，救苦救难，请问，你凭什么说那个处处比你好的人不如你呢，到底为什么不肯承认人家就是比你强，而一定要无事生非，指鹿为马，败坏别人声誉而不择手段，无所不用其极，究竟为了什么？ 给个能够拿得出手的理由先！！！！ H.H第三世多杰羌佛是一定利益众生、弘扬如来正法的，达赖集团是一定戕害众生、为害佛法的，这两者泾渭分明，无法调和，所以达赖集团是一定要诽谤并陷害 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛，妄图把 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛描述成一个宗教骗子，这恰恰是他们自己的真实写照！
(8) 达赖集团的用心是司马昭之心，路人皆知，正如文章里他们自己说的因为 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的降世，其作为世界佛教当之无愧的领袖，至高至圣，世界各个佛教领袖就会降格为旗下教派领导者！ 其实 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛从来也没有这样的行为，是有些人自己这样认为，是那些自以为是佛教领袖的人担心害怕。如果这个领袖真的是具备圣证量的法王，那么他不会担心这一点，有佛陀利益众生就应该是他的心愿，是更好不过，真害怕被 “降格” 当不成领袖的是自以为佛教领袖，却根本没有五明、没有圣证量的人。因为这样一来，有个真佛降世了，那些打着世袭旗号，装神弄鬼，混淆是非，自以为是，指手画脚，发号施令的人再没有了用武之地。这也就是说 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的出现，真正地了断了这些披着佛法外衣四处骗人的喝佛血、吃佛肉、掠夺众生钱财的家伙们的未来！ 只说在现实中， H.H. 多杰羌佛第三世只义务服务众生，不收任何供养，这在世界上也是千古第一人。对于达赖等类人靠以众生的供养为生、靠卖票讲演收钱为业的他们，两相对比之下，谁公谁私，谁圣谁凡，一目了然。有 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛在世，就没有他们诳惑众生的可能，这怎么能不让以此为生的人恨之入骨呢？ 跳出来谩骂，诽谤，否定，诬陷，是必然的，也是没办法的办法，若非如此，难道他们会心甘情愿地去跟 H.H. 第三世多杰羌学佛修行吗？ 去学不收供养吗？ 不是真正的圣者，凡夫之流却拥有高高的地位和巨大的利益，德不配位，贪利之人怎会轻易放弃？ 如果没有了佛教领袖这个名头，没有了藏传佛教代表这个金招牌，还怎么以佛教领袖的姿态四处招摇，见些政客名流，还怎么以政府迫害宗教领袖为由诽谤中国政府? 还怎么来满足那些背后支持分裂中国的恩客？ 那么来自别人心里上的怜悯、出于政治目的的支持和金钱上的资助都将化为乌有，今后的路，怎么走下去呢，想想也会忧愁不已；只有打掉这个 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛，所谓的领袖身份才会保住，现在有的一切才不会消失。学佛的人，没有不知道因果不昧的，如此不知因果，不信因果，违背因果，却还不知羞耻，狂妄自称佛教领袖，以为释迦世尊入灭，从而败坏他的教法，欺负他的弟子，诳惑众生无知，打着佛教的幌子招摇撞骗，你当真以为佛陀好欺负不成？！你当真以为世尊离世，再无大圣再临吗？！！！ 一切众生是三世十方诸佛之亲人，诸佛菩萨自会应缘降世降魔除妖，以各种方式延续佛法，守护众生直至成佛！
(9) 至于文中其他的诽谤，真实不值一驳，幼稚并且可笑，比如诬陷华藏寺里没有佛像，只有 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的像，这种蒙骗外行、凭空编造谎言的胡说八道，真是让人无可奈何，有没有佛像，到华藏寺一看不就行了，高大的释迦世尊的法像，庄严无比的阿弥托佛的法像、观音菩萨的法像、弥勒菩萨的法像、韦驮菩萨的法像、伽蓝菩萨的法像都在大殿里供奉着，都是正规的神佛体系的法像，一尊 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的像也没有塑，凤凰周刊颠倒黑白玷污圣洁的行为不觉得低级吗？ 还羞辱佛陀，说佛陀没有头发，并因此对佛陀发明生发产品一事进行嘲笑，笔者想问一句能写出这内容的人，你到底有没有见过H.H 第三世多杰羌佛？ 就算你没见过，不去问问见过的人吗？ 凡是有缘拜见过H.H.第三世多杰羌佛的人，都知道 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛是满头的青丝黑发，从几年前代众生担苦之相，突然返老回春变成了庄严佛陀之相，连这个简单的事实都要说谎 否认，我想提供给凤凰周刊这些信息的人可能是专门为算计凤凰周刊来的，是凤凰周刊的高级黑啊。再换个角度来说，有没有头发和有没有发明生发产品有什么必然联系？ 能发明有益于解决人类痛苦的产品不但不被赞叹，反而被嘲笑，其毒肝然啊！
(10) 舆论的影响力是巨大的，为此世界各国对本国从事新闻报导的媒体，包括平面、电视和网络，都有法律上的规定，要求报道的内容必须依据事实。因为一份报道，看的人很有可能不了解报道的内容，也不是有关的专家，普通大众会不加分析地看，跟着报道走，接受报道里的定位和判断是自然的结果。人嘴两层皮，话如何讲，结果会截然不同。这也是为什么从事新闻工作的人必须要有严谨的工作作风，脱离个人情绪的客观报导，用事实说话而不是自己的观点。但是凤凰周刊这两篇报道却完全漠视相关法律规定，也与全世界新闻从业者所奉行的职业道德背道而驰。从法律 上讲不合法，侵权无疑；从新闻报道的角度，这两篇文章是新闻从业者的耻辱，凤凰周刊已经丧失基本的职业道德，必须为此承担一切后果和责任。名凤凰者非梧桐而不栖，非甘露而不饮，高雅圣洁，绝不会自甘堕落！ 凤凰周刊玷污凤凰的名声，从此不要叫这个名字了。这样的甘心做达赖的口舌，置中央政府和港府、美国国会的态度于何处？ 如此没有原则，公然背弃人权道义，而且毫无忌讳， 欺骗香港、大陆和全世界的华人，置公众的智慧于何处？ 公然诽谤和陷害 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛，置佛法和因果于何处？ 凤凰凤凰兮其名不符。笔者非为 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛座下高僧大德，只是一名研究过佛教、佛学、佛法的修行人，读过一些古德祖师、高僧大德的论著，现在读羌佛的论著和世尊的三藏十二部经。稍有佛法的修为即可印证 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛法音与三藏十二部经经意相符，如来正法无疑，何况佛陀证量在世间，诽谤的人用什么方法才能来抹杀和否定这一切呢？ 而他们就这么做了，没证没凭，却长篇大论，言之凿凿，公然诽谤，愚弄那些不明所以的大众，做足了打击的架势。如此欺负一个身负至高证量，却无私忍辱不分辨的巨圣，怎不叫人气愤？ 而凤凰周刊为达赖一伙愚弄普通民众和不了解情况的读者，欺骗那些对佛法和真相一无所知的人，这就更不公平。笔者为了对社会负责，是经过了许多实人实证的调查，铁证如山，才行文落笔，分析给大家听，孰是孰非，读者自会一目了然。凤凰周刊为达赖等辈发声意图陷害 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的目的是达不到的，会有更多的众生因听闻到 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的佛号，即便一时误解，也会被佛陀的德行和证量感召而最终明白事实真相，会知道 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛的伟大圣洁是无人能与匹敌的。而凤凰周刊因为诽谤，为无数的众生跟随 H.H. 第三世多杰羌佛学佛修行种下了因缘，会让世界更加祥和，这点应该绝对不是陷害者推出这两篇诽谤文章想要达到的目的。
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